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Abstract 
The ability to collaborate has always been vitally important to businesses and enterprises. 
With the availability of current networking and computing power, the creation of 
Collaborative Working Environments (CWEs) has allowed for this process to occur 
anytime over any geographical distance. Sharing information between individuals 
through collaborative environments creates new challenges in privacy protection for 
organizations and the members of organizations. This thesis confronts the problems when 
attempting to protect the personal private information of collaborating individuals. 
In this thesis, a privacy-by-policy approach is taken to addressing the issue of protecting 
private information within collaborative environments. A privacy-by-policy approach to 
privacy protection provides collaborating individuals with notice and choice surrounding 
their private information, in order to provide an individual with a level of control over 
how their information is to be used. To this end, a collaborative privacy architecture for 
providing privacy within a collaborative environment is presented. This architecture uses 
ontologies to express the static concept and relation definitions required for privacy and 
collaboration. The collaborative privacy architecture also contains a Collaborative 
Privacy Manager (CPM) service which handles changes in dynamic collaborative 
environments. The goals of this thesis are to provide privacy mechanisms for the non-
client centric situation of collaborative working environments. This thesis also strives to 
provide privacy through technically enforceable and customizable privacy policies. To 
this end, individual collaborators are provided with access, modification rights, and 
transparency through the use of ontologies built into the architecture. Finally, individual 
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collaborators are provided these privacy protections in a way that is easy to use and 
understand and use. 
A collaborative scenario as a test case is described to present how this architecture would 
benefit individuals and organizations when they are engaged in collaborative work. In 
this case study a university and hospital are engaged in collaborative research which 
involves the use of private information belonging to collaborators and patients from the 
hospital. This case study also highlights how different organizations can be under 
different sets of legislative guidelines and how these guidelines can be incorporated into 
the privacy architecture. Through this collaboration scenario an implementation of the 
collaborative privacy architecture is provided, along with results from semantic and 
privacy rule executions, and measurements of how actions carried out by the architecture 
perform under various conditions. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
The ability to create dynamic, collaborative environments is essential to highly 
networked organizations. Pooling together the resources and talents of a group of people 
allows for complex problems and projects to be completed. The current state of 
networking and software technology allows this collaborative process to extend beyond 
the traditional common workplace. Collaborative Working Environments (CWEs) are 
distributed software applications and platforms that support both individual and group 
shared work in many areas, including research, business and learning [41]. CWEs allow 
for collaboration between individuals over vast geographical distances, and between 
individuals of differing enterprises. Within the CWE, individuals can be organized into 
groups and projects in order to complete tasks. 
A major issue that must be addressed for collaborative environments is that of providing 
privacy protection and control for the individuals who use the environment. Privacy is a 
fundamental issue that is, or should be, a concern of everyone. The ability to protect 
private information remains one of the top concerns for distributed and e-service 
technologies [63][85]. Proper privacy protection should not only help prevent the harmful 
release of personal information, but also provide individuals with control over how their 
information should be used when the information is shared. Having adequate privacy 
protection also fosters user confidence in the collaborative environment. Providing 
privacy in CWEs requires the use of privacy policies which allow individuals to outline 
how they wish their private information to be used by others. It also requires a way for 
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these privacy policies to be processed during the collaboration. CWEs are dynamic 
environments, where an individual collaborator can change their role, task or who they 
are collaborating with during runtime. This dynamicity requires that any privacy 
protection system for CWEs must be able to determine and infer how information should 
be shared as the situation changes. This thesis focuses on providing a privacy solution 
that can determine how information is to be shared in collaborative working 
environments. 
1.1 Motivation 
The rapidly changing and highly connected nature of collaborative environments 
provides many opportunities for private information to be used in ways not intended by 
the individual to whom the information is about. The number of interactions taking place 
within a collaborative environment rises as the number of individuals working within that 
environment rises. This increase of interactions raises the risk of unwanted private 
information exposure or use. A proper balance between the release and protection of 
information within a collaborative environment is necessary for the success of the 
collaboration. This thesis is concerned with personal private information. Private 
information is any information which describes some aspect of an individual. While this 
information can range in how well it describes an individual, it all remains personal 
private information. An example of a general type of private information is one's age, 
which is an attribute that is shared among many people. Age can narrow an individual 
from a large group into a smaller group of people who share the same birth year. Private 
information such as this can only identify an individual when combined with other pieces 
of information. On the other side of the range of private information is Personally 
3 
 
 
 
Identifiable Information (PII). PII is defined as any information that uniquely and directly 
identifies an individual [51]. Such information provides a one-to-one relationship 
between the information and the individual to whom it relates, such as an employee, 
credit card or social insurance number. 
Protecting privacy in a collaborative environment produces unique challenges, different 
from a typical privacy scenario. Traditional privacy protection solutions focus on one-to-
one, or one-to-many situations where a single large entity uses the information of an 
individual or group of individuals. Such situations are typical in a consumer-provider 
scenario, where it is often adequate to only be concerned with privacy violations made by 
the larger collecting entity. This singular focus is no longer sufficient when dealing with 
a collaborative environment [64]. Collaborative environments are many-to-many 
situations where every individual poses a possible privacy risk. An additional challenge 
with collaborative environments is that the individuals collaborating are dynamic. This 
dynamicity allows a collaborating individual to enter and exit the CWE, and change their 
roles, groups and projects while collaborating. A solution for privacy in CWEs must be 
able to maintain its ability to determine who has access to what information and why, as 
the environment changes. The solution should also be able to detect any conflicts that 
may occur between privacy rules that are created. 
1.2 Thesis Contributions 
This thesis has several goals which together form its scope. A main goal of this thesis is 
to create an ontology for privacy. Ontologies are formal representations of a set of 
concepts and the relationships between those concepts within a specific domain [44]. 
Ontologies are able to define a domain, and are able to make reasoning decisions to infer 
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new knowledge within the domain. This new knowledge is stored within the domain 
ontology in the form of new relationships between instances of the domain concepts. A 
privacy ontology is able to model the relationships between collaborating individuals and 
their private information according to privacy policies. This privacy ontology also 
contains a definition of what these privacy policies should be. Privacy policies allow 
individuals, through a set of privacy rules, to properly outline how their private 
information should be accessed and used by others. Each privacy rule consists of privacy 
elements that describe how each piece of private information may be used by another 
individual. What elements are required for information within a collaborative 
environment and why they are required is presented and explained. This ontology should 
be able to accommodate privacy guidelines and legislations in order to satisfy real world 
conditions placed on organizations. The creation of a privacy ontology will allow our 
solution to be integrated with an ontology for collaborative communication through 
sessions [32], to create a solution for enabling collaborative work while taking privacy 
principles into account. To the best of our knowledge, ontologies have not been used 
before to express concepts and relations amongst privacy and collaboration. 
Another goal of this thesis is to present a solution that keeps a collaborating individual 
properly informed of their privacy situation, and can provide assistance to maintaining 
their privacy protection. Both of these points are important to increasing the acceptance 
of collaboration technology. Keeping an individual informed of how their privacy is 
being protected increases the confidence that individual has in the collaborative 
environment. The assistance provided by the solution is important to ensure any 
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individual does not become overwhelmed by the privacy solution, as this occurrence can 
cause individuals to abandon the collaboration. 
These goals are provided through the creation of a collaborative privacy architecture. 
This architecture provided in this thesis must be able to operate in dynamic, many-to-
many environments, and be compatible with any implementation standard. Dynamicity is 
a strength of collaboration, as it allows new projects to be worked on and completed 
during runtime. Maintaining privacy as the situation changes is important to maintain this 
strength. Allowing the use of any standard approach in implementing this solution allows 
the solution to reach a wider audience, and ensures compatibility for many different 
domains. The solution provided in this thesis allows services to be used within the 
architecture to provide the collaborators with different functionalities according to the 
requirements of the domain. These abilities allow the solution to operate in collaborative 
environments with varying size and complexity. 
The collaborative privacy architecture presented in this thesis contains ontologies for 
privacy and collaboration, which allow for the representation of the required concepts in 
those fields. These ontologies overlap and are combined to provide a representation of a 
privacy providing collaborative environment. Ontologies provide the ability to flexibly 
introduce semantics into a system [61], which means the introduction of meaning into the 
words and concepts used by the system. Ontologies also has the advantage of being able 
to capture the meaning of user-defined vocabularies [61]. It is because of these abilities 
that ontologies are utilized in this thesis as a way to introduce the semantics of privacy 
and collaboration into the collaborative privacy architecture. 
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In this thesis, a focus is placed on dynamic adaptation in collaborative environments 
where the collaborators can play one or more roles and belong to one or more groups or 
projects. The communication of the collaborators are organized depending on their 
current roles, both within an organization and within projects. A set of interconnected 
components are deployed for use by the individuals in a flexible way so that the 
individual collaborators can dynamically change their roles during the collaborative 
activity. To assist with the managing of privacy within this dynamic activity, another goal 
of this thesis is to introduce and describe the Collaborative Privacy Manager (CPM) 
service [3]. The CPM is designed to provide a set of privacy management functions that 
assist collaborators within organizations, groups and projects. The architecture of the 
CPM, consisting of several levels and modules, is introduced. As collaborative 
environments depend on the interaction between many individuals, the proper protection 
of private information within a collaborative environment is vital. This thesis presents a 
generic collaborative privacy architecture that provides organizational systems with the 
ability to allow for: (1) the collaboration of individuals that is domain independent, and 
(2) the protection of private information both within an organization and between 
different organizations. 
1.3 The Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into several chapters as follows: 
 Chapter 2 presents a review of the current literature on privacy and collaboration. 
This review contains an examination of the concepts of collaborative 
environments and privacy. How these concepts are defined and why they are 
important are discussed. A look at how the concerns of privacy are relevant to 
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collaborative environments is also presented. This chapter also contains a review 
of current approaches of privacy protection, both inside and outside the domain of 
collaborative environments. Initial research that examines the problem of 
providing privacy in collaborative environments is first presented. This is 
followed by works that use collaboration itself as a solution to providing privacy 
protection in some domains. Next, other solutions to providing privacy in 
collaborative environments are presented, and how these approaches differ from 
the work in this thesis. Finally, this chapter concludes with an examination of how 
privacy is dealt with in the legal domain by different countries around the world. 
 Chapter 3 contains the description of the collaborative privacy architecture 
created in this thesis. This architecture consists of five physical layers and one 
logical layer, each layer containing several components. Each layer and 
component is explained and detailed, outlining their purpose and why they are 
necessary. This chapter introduces the three types of actors who interact with the 
architecture, explaining the abilities each actor has. This chapter also contains the 
introduction and definition of the privacy policies used by this thesis. These 
privacy policies allow individual collaborators to define who has access to their 
information and for what reasons. A privacy policy is defined as a set of privacy 
rules, and each rule is defined as a set of four privacy elements. These elements 
are introduced in this chapter along with an explanation of how and why they 
were selected. This chapter also contains an introduction and formal description 
of the ontologies used in this thesis. This chapter also contains a look at how 
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conflicts can be dealt with in policies, and what reasoning abilities the 
architecture contains. 
 Chapter 4 explains the behaviour of the collaborative privacy architecture. This is 
presented through a set of use cases and scenarios. This chapter presents the 
important ideas of how the layers within the architecture communicate and 
interact. 
 Chapter 5 describes the Collaborative Privacy Manager (CPM). The architecture 
for this service is shown and detailed to highlight what components it consists of 
and how these components interact, along with the base functionality of the CPM. 
This chapter serves to describe why the CPM is an important part of the 
collaborative privacy architecture and how it assists in the protection of privacy 
within a collaborative environment. 
 Chapter 6 contains a case study and implementation details of the collaborative 
privacy architecture. This case study involves the collaboration of a university and 
hospital for the purposes of medical research and is presented and explained in 
order to highlight how the architecture works in conjunction with a collaborative 
environment to protect the privacy of collaborating individuals. Results and 
measurements from the operation of the architecture are presented in this chapter. 
 Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by providing a discussion on the presented 
collaborative privacy architecture, and highlighting directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
In this chapter a literature review is presented focusing on the relevant concepts and ideas 
of this thesis. This review includes looking individually at collaborative working 
environments and privacy, in order to demonstrate how these concepts are currently 
being considered. Other approaches for providing privacy in collaborative environments 
are also presented. The interaction between collaboration and privacy are examined in 
related fields, in order to provide further ideas and context. For example, collaboration 
has been used as a means to provide privacy and this provides a useful example of how 
the fields of privacy and collaboration can be tied together. Many techniques used for 
providing privacy through collaboration are used in creating a privacy solution for 
collaboration. As well, much research has been done into the issue of privacy in other 
areas, and from this work many important ideas and lessons can also be learned. To this 
end, some works outside the domain of collaborative environments are also examined in 
this chapter. 
2.1 Collaboration Work Environments 
The ability to collaborate has always been vitally important to organizations. Pooling 
together the resources and talents of a group of people is how organizations are able to 
solve complex problems and tasks. Current networking and software technologies allow 
this collaborative process to extend far beyond the traditional common workplace. The 
CWE of an organization consists of the set of collaborative applications that are used for 
collaboration between different partners or entities, across both intra-organizational and 
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inter-organization boundaries [66]. This interaction within a CWE can unite individuals 
over large geographical distances, as well as uniting individuals who work for separate 
organizations. Within the CWE, groups and sub-groups can be used to bring together 
individuals with a common specialization or function. Projects can be used to bring 
together diverse individuals to tackle specific tasks. 
As with any software system, a CWE must meet many functional and non-functional 
requirements in order to be successful and productive. Functional requirements are needs 
that define what the CWE is required to do, such as being able to share a specific file, or 
being able to support synchronous communication. Non-functional requirements define 
constraints and qualities upon the CWE, such as the environment's availability or 
reliability. When comparing functional to non-functional requirements, the problems 
surrounding non-functional requirements often require more thought and planning to 
solve, as these issues can be vague and difficult to quantify. This thesis focuses on one 
such non-functional requirement of CWEs, that of providing privacy protection and 
control for the collaborating individuals. Managing privacy is an important but 
challenging part of collaborative work [50]. With estimates saying that by 2015 there will 
be 1.3 billion mobile workers worldwide all requiring some form of CWE [30], the 
ability to protect privacy in CWEs is quickly becoming essential. 
2.2 The Evolving Definition of Privacy 
The definition of privacy has changed dramatically over time. Privacy has evolved from 
"the right to be left alone" [14] to the current concerns over the control and release of an 
individual's private information. By definition, private information is any information 
that relates directly to an individual [46]. This means that private information contains 
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some description of the information owner. For an individual, the most concerning type 
of private information is Personally Identifiable Information (PII). PII is the most 
concerning, because the sharing of a single piece of information is enough to directly 
identify the individual. Groups, projects and organizations must be concerned with the 
private information of their members. 
Further complicating the issue is the subjective nature inherent to privacy. What an 
individual considers to be private can vary over time, region and between different 
cultures. What one individual considers private is often not the same as what a different 
individual would consider as private. Context is very important to privacy; even the same 
information may require different privacy protection in different contexts [62]. As 
interactions through networked machines become increasingly commonplace, the easier it 
becomes to share information between other individuals and parties. The usage of 
collected information is also a concern of privacy, as privacy requires that information 
owners have a say over how their personal information is used [82]. Therefore, in this 
thesis privacy is defined as follows: 
 Privacy is the ability to keep secret the information about oneself that one does 
not wish to share, as well as the ability to retain some level of control over other 
personal information that has been willingly shared. 
In this definition, to keep secret information means to not allow someone to view the 
information, to keep that information confidential. Though this ability can be provided 
through some manner of access control, it is important to distinguish the entire idea of 
privacy protection from access control. Computer science often treats access control as 
the solution to privacy [6][36], which is to simply determine what user has access to what 
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information. Privacy however must also be concerned with how information will be used. 
Access control can be an important tool in helping to protect privacy, but it is not a 
complete solution to the problem. One example of how access control fails to provide 
privacy protection is the ability to infer personal information [31]. Given access to some 
personal information, it is possible to accurately infer other pieces of personal 
information. Therefore a straight access control model is not sufficient when attempting 
to protect specific pieces of information. A proper privacy solution should have the 
ability to allow individuals to provide only the characteristics they wish to share. Another 
issue with privacy as access control is that individuals are often unable to predict what 
the consequences of their privacy policy will be. As such, they are unprepared or 
unqualified to make every privacy related decision on their own. Traditional access 
control models do not explicitly handle privacy issues and fail to model the sharing 
relationships between individuals in a collaborative environment [43]. 
The idea of some level of control in my presented definition of privacy is described in this 
thesis as allowing the user to provide notice and choice over how their information will 
be used. This includes the ability for the information owner to state how the information 
should be used, and how long it can be used for. 
2.3 Privacy in Legislation 
It is important to discuss how privacy is being addressed internationally through laws. 
These laws are important tools in forming accountability, as there must be some form of 
punishment for those who break privacy agreements. Like all laws, privacy laws vary 
between countries. This in itself is an issue, as our current interconnected world often 
utilizes software that crosses international boundaries. Collaboration is one such situation 
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where work can take place between different countries. A great many countries around 
the world contain their own privacy legislation. To place some constraints on the size of 
the scope presented in this thesis, a focus will be placed on the laws of Canada and the 
European Union. These two locations were selected as this thesis was created as a joint 
venture between universities in Canada and France. 
2.3.1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
In 1980, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
completed and adopted its Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data [60]. These guidelines were then recommended to the OECD 
member countries [37], which at the time consisted of 24 countries [59]. A list of all the 
OECD member countries is shown in Appendix A. The OECD guidelines consist of eight 
principles that allow individuals to express their privacy requirements, and place 
obligations on organizations to follow those requirements. These eight principles together 
describe how issues surrounding the gathering and usage of private information should be 
addressed. These privacy principles are known as Fair Information Practices (FIP). The 
FIP of the OECD were very influential, as they were used to form the basis for most of 
the data protection and privacy legislation around the world [62]. Even though how 
society and technology approaches private information has changed greatly since the 
creation of the OECD FIP, they remain an efficient foundation for the operation of global 
information systems [37]. As such, it is important to understand the FIP of the OECD 
when creating a privacy solution. These FIP will play an important role later in this thesis 
when determining what conditions should be specified when information is to be 
collected. The eight privacy principles defined by the OECD are as follows. 
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Collection Limitation Principle 
This principle states that there must be limits placed on the collection of any personal 
information. Any information that is collected must be gathered lawfully, with the 
permission and knowledge of the information subject. 
Data Quality Principle 
The data quality principle states that personal information may only be collected if the 
gathered information is relevant to the purpose for which it is required. Any gathered 
information must also be current, correct and complete. 
Purpose Specification Principle 
This principle outlines that the reasons for why any personal information is being 
collected must be specified by the information collector before or at the time of the 
information collection. If there are any changes to these reasons in the future, the 
information collector is obligated to inform the information subject. 
Use Limitation Principle 
The Use Limitation Principle states that any personal information that is collected will 
only be used for the purposes specified by the Purpose Specification Principle. The only 
exceptions to this rule are if consent has been given by the information subject, or if a 
request for the information has been made with the authority of law. 
Security Safeguards Principle 
This principle states that all personal information that has been collected must be 
protected against threats through all reasonable and realistic security safeguards. These 
protections should shield the information as best as possible from risks such as 
unauthorized access, deletion, modification, use and exposure. 
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Openness Principle 
This principle states that the information collector must provide a level of transparency to 
the information subject regarding the information collection process. Information subjects 
should also be provided by the collector with a method to inquire about the information 
that has been collected. These inquiries should allow for the discovery of what personal 
information has been collected, what kind of information has been collected, the purpose 
for the information collection, the identity of the information collector, and the location 
of the information. 
Individual Participation Principle 
This principle states that the information subjects should be able to determine if any of 
their information has been collected by an information collector. If information on an 
individual has been collected, that individual should have the ability to request for their 
information to be sent to them in an understandable format, in a reasonable amount of 
time. An information subject should be provided with the ability to challenge the 
accuracy of the information that has been gathered on them, and if proven correct, this 
information should be edited or deleted. 
Accountability Principle 
The Accountability principle states that the information gatherer must be held responsible 
for ensuring all the above stated principles are followed. 
2.3.2 Canada 
Data protection legislation in Canada is made up of several laws at different levels of 
government. At the highest level, the Government of Canada has specified data privacy 
legislation through the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
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(PIPEDA) [55] and the Privacy Act [17]. PIPEDA applies to organizations that operate in 
the private sector, while the Privacy Act applies to federally regulated organizations. 
PIPEDA was created in the year 2000 and includes ten principles of privacy that were 
created based on the FIP of the OECD. The data protection requirements of public sector 
organizations in Canada are covered by provincial legislation, such as the Freedom of 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) [22] in Ontario. Private information 
that is related to health care is covered under a separate act in Canada, the Personal 
Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) [23]. Each of these acts outline how private 
information should be collected, used and disclosed in their respective domain. In a 
country such as Canada, where more than one piece of privacy legislation are in effect, it 
is possible for a collaborative environment to join organizations that are covered under 
different legislations. As such, it is important that a privacy solution include the ability to 
consider different guidelines and legislations. 
Canada also utilizes an ombudsman known as the Privacy Commissioner [54] who is 
tasked with being an advocate for the privacy rights of Canadians, and who reports 
directly to two parts of Canada's Parliament: the House of Commons and the Senate [35]. 
The powers of the Privacy Commissioner include the ability to investigate complaints, 
reporting on the handling of private information by public and private sector 
organizations, conducting research into privacy issues, and promoting privacy rights, 
issues and practices to the general public [35]. The idea of having a person well versed in 
the issues of privacy to oversee and promote privacy to others is an important one, as it is 
possible for an administrator of privacy issues to take a similar role when organizations 
attempt to provide privacy support. 
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2.3.3 Europe 
Data privacy legislation for the European Union (EU) is defined according to "Directive 
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data," [18] more commonly referred to as the Data 
Protection Directive. The Data Protection Directive was enacted in 1995, and 
incorporates all eight FIP of the OECD, as described in Section 2.3.1. As with all EU 
Directives, the Data Protection Directive is not directly binding, but instead it has been 
used by member countries as a basis to create and enact their own data privacy 
legislations. The Data Protection Directive once again highlights the importance and 
influence of the OECD FIP. 
Some problems with the Data Protection Directive have become apparent. One major 
problem is that the process of countries in the EU using the Data Protection Directive as 
the basis for their own privacy legislations has created a set laws across Europe that are 
similar, but not exactly the same. This fragmentation has caused confusion and difficulty 
when attempting to create any privacy solution that applies to all EU countries. To solve 
the issues of the Data Protection Directive, the EU is currently in the process of replacing 
it with new legislation, known as "Personal data protection: processing and free 
movement of data (General Data Protection Regulation)" [19]. A significant difference 
with this new legislation is that it is not a directive, but rather an EU regulation. 
Regulations are binding across all EU member countries, and therefore all countries 
within the EU will be required follow the exact same legislation once it has been 
finalized. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) also aims to address newer 
technologies that were not addressed by the 1995 Data Protection Directive, including 
cloud computing and social networks. To this end, the GDPR applies to any organization 
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that processes data of EU citizens, even if that organization is located in another country. 
Other changes in the GDPR include that individuals must be able to opt-in to allowing 
their data to be collected, rather than opt-out. There must be a standard approach to 
explaining why information is being collected and how it is being used. This new GDPR 
would introduce sanctions of up to 2% of an organization's annual revenue [77], 
providing a strong incentive for organizations to follow the privacy regulations. 
2.4 Privacy in Collaboration 
Collaborative working environments, as the name implies, allow for the collaboration of 
work between many individuals. The ability to transfer information between many 
different individuals and groups is the main strength of a CWE, as it allows for the 
completion of otherwise complicated and distributed work. However this ability also 
carries with it many concerns related to privacy. As information is passed between 
collaborating members within a CWE, issues of privacy quickly become apparent. An 
individual must be able to specify exactly which individual or group of individuals are 
allowed access to their private information. Similarly, the information that is accessible 
by others must specify the conditions under which that information may be used. 
The first step in protecting an individual's privacy is to allow that individual to clearly 
state their privacy preferences. This is done through the creation of a privacy policy that 
is able to describe privacy rules that range from specific to general [7]. This gives the 
policy owner fine-grained control over their own policy, while allowing a Privacy 
Administrator (PA) to create policies to cover many individuals. PAs are administrators 
who are given training in privacy guidelines and the creation of privacy policies and rules. 
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Even with a proper privacy policy in place, issues remain in the attempt to provide 
privacy. Any privacy system that is developed must be made as user friendly as possible, 
as systems that are deemed too complicated by an individual will often be disregarded or 
disabled [24]. An informed individual will be better able to protect their own information. 
However, even with the best attempts at education, many individuals will be left 
unqualified to make their own privacy decisions for every scenario [1]. The situation of 
being unqualified to make decisions about one's own privacy stems from the complexity 
of the problem. As discussed in Section 2.2, the definition of privacy is dynamic and 
subjective, and as a result not every individual will interpret the same privacy principles 
in the same way. Privacy is also complex, as private information that may seem safe to 
share can be combined with other information or be used at a later date to exploit 
individuals in ways that are difficult for a layperson to predict. Due to the complexity of 
the subject of privacy, the behaviour of an individual towards privacy is also complex [1]. 
These problems are amplified in a CWE, which by its nature is dynamic as new 
individuals and groups enter, leave, and change within the environment in real-time. The 
definition of privacy presented in this thesis in Section 2.2 includes the ability to have 
some level of control over how private information is being used. In order to accomplish 
this, a collaborating individual must know who has access to their information and how it 
can be used. As such, the definition of a privacy policy must be featured alongside a 
business service that can provide users with assistance. In this thesis, such a business 
service is described, known as a Collaborative Privacy Manager (CPM). The CPM is first 
introduced in Chapter 3, while a full description of its architecture and roles are presented 
in Chapter 5. 
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2.5 Collaboration as a Tool 
Instead of providing privacy protection for collaboration, some works examine the idea 
of providing privacy through collaboration. These works are able to provide useful looks 
at how the fields of privacy and collaboration can be tied together. As well, many of the 
techniques used for providing privacy through collaboration will be used in creating a 
privacy solution for collaboration. 
A work by Anthonysamy, Rashid, Walkerdine, Greenwood, and Larkou [5] takes on the 
issue of privacy in online social networks by using collaboration to share privacy 
configurations among the users of the social network. This approach allows the social 
network users to make fine-grained control decisions over what private information they 
are willing to share. The information that is selected is then saved into an access control 
configuration. These configurations can then be shared to, and rated by, other users in the 
social network. Finally, the rated configurations are made available for use by users of 
the social network, where they select those configurations they feel will adequately 
provide them protection. While not addressing collaborative environments directly, this 
idea of being able to select from privacy configurations that have been vetted in some 
manner (in this case, through a rating system) is an important one. This reduces the 
amount of work required from new users joining the network, and reduces errors for 
users with minimal privacy experience. This idea may be implemented in this thesis 
through an expansion to the CPM, to allow it to analyze previously created privacy 
policies and make recommendations to new collaborators that require their own privacy 
policy. 
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In a work by Hong, Mingxuan, and Shen [26], the authors extend P3P [15] with the goal 
of representing user privacy preferences for context-aware applications. A markup 
language is proposed that is suitable for both privacy policies and user preferences. This 
thesis does not use P3P directly, but instead defines its own privacy policy format which 
is described within a custom privacy ontology. P3P is not used in this thesis as it was 
designed specifically for the domain of Web pages, and does not translate well to a 
collaboration type environment. This is because P3P contains privacy elements that are 
not required in this thesis, such as a category element that describes the type of 
information. As well, P3P predefines the possible options for its elements. For example, 
the purpose tag consists of twelve possible options and a P3P policy can only select one-
to-many of these options [15]. In this thesis a more general approach is taken, one which 
can be extended to fit the needs of different domains. However, P3P and the ontology 
presented in this thesis have foundations in the same privacy guidelines [60]. 
A work by Kolter, Kernchen and Pernul [39] also explores the idea of collaborative 
privacy management, in this case for users of the World Wide Web. This solution utilizes 
two main elements to provide privacy protection. The first element is a privacy 
community, which is tasked with providing feedback, experiences and ratings about the 
privacy policies of Web service providers. This privacy community acts as the central 
element of a privacy architecture [39]. The second main element is described as a set of 
three local privacy components: privacy protection generator, privacy agent, and data 
disclosure log [39]. The privacy protection generator caters to inexperienced users by 
allowing for easy to create privacy policies and the selection of predefined Internet 
service types. The function of the privacy agent component is to assist the Web user in 
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making informed decisions about what private information the website being visited 
requires, and what information will be disclosed. The third component, the data 
disclosure log, records what information has been shared in past Web exchanges. In the 
best case scenario, the data disclosure log would allow a Web user to access, change or 
remove information they have previous shared [39]. This approach is concerned with 
private information disseminated over the Web, which differs from the work in this thesis. 
It also deals with privacy policies described using P3P [15], which again differs from the 
custom privacy policy format and privacy ontology for CWEs used in this thesis. 
However the ideas presented, making it easy for inexperienced users to create policies, 
allowing policies to be compared and ranked, and assisting users in making informed 
decisions, are all important ideas that have influenced the design of the CPM. 
2.6 Other Attempts at Privacy for CWEs 
Korba et al. [40] outline the challenges of managing PII in a collaborative environment. 
An agent-based prototype is described to support automated enterprise management of 
PII. The described approach combines several data mining techniques to manage the life 
cycle of private data, including private data discovery, social network analysis, 
knowledge visualization, and effective human-computer interaction. The developed 
prototype can automate the management of PII within an organization by collecting, 
analyzing and applying security policies on that PII. One drawback of this approach is 
that it has the potential to actively monitor and analyze all user activity and behaviours 
within a collaborative environment. This monitoring can cause concerns among the users 
of the prototype. The work by Korba et al. [40] is concerned with the discovery of PII 
through data mining, the collection of the discovered PII and the management of the 
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collected PII. This differs from the collaborative privacy architecture presented in this 
thesis which does not collect and analyze personal information. As well, while the work 
by Korba et al. [40] does discuss the use of privacy policies, it does not detail what these 
privacy policies should look like, which is done in the work presented in this thesis. 
Kanovich, Rowe and Scedrov [33] propose an abstract formal model of collaboration 
which addresses privacy concerns. A state transition system is used in order to model 
private data through the use of a syntactic convention on a predicate symbol. The goal of 
this model is to describe how to generate a collaborative plan by providing some privacy 
guarantees to the participants. The generated collaborative plan is a sequence of 
transitions which will transform the environment from an initial state into a specific goal 
state. The work by Kanovich, Rowe and Scedrov [33] has a different definition of privacy 
than the definition given in this thesis. The authors equate privacy with secrecy, and are 
focused on developing a proper balance between the protection and release of 
information and resources [33]. This differs from the approach to privacy taken in this 
thesis, as privacy is not considered to be just the isolation of private information. Instead, 
in this thesis privacy includes the ability to understand how information is being used, 
why it is being used, and to have some influence over these decisions. 
Burnap et al. [10] describe a method of using "sticky policies" to retain access control 
even after information has been moved to an autonomous computer system outside the 
control of the information owner. This ability is achieved by attaching a privacy policy 
alongside the private information (a process known as creating a sticky policy), while at 
the same time distributing the access control elements. By attaching the policy with the 
information, the information gatherer will always have access to the access control 
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document they must check against. Similarly, distributing the access control elements 
allows both the information collector and the information owner to access the policy 
decision maker even from different environments. This access will allow for the 
information collector to check their access rights, and will allow the information owner to 
change the access rights [10]. The idea of being able to retain a measure of control over 
information that has been released into a collaborative environment is an important one. 
This approach by Burnap et al. [10] shows one technical approach to how this could be 
accomplished. This work differs from the architecture described in this thesis as the 
access control available through sticky policies only permit access based on roles, and 
does not take into consideration how an individual may be using the information. 
Malik and Dustdar [43] describe a method for sharing private information in a 
collaborative working scenario through an expansion to the RBAC NIST standard [53]. 
The scenarios considered by the authors of this work are similar to the scenario described 
in this thesis, where overlapping teams work to complete shared tasks. In the approach 
taken by Malik and Dustdar, five main data elements are identified: enterprise, team, task, 
role and user [43]. The use of a task element differs from the approach in this thesis, 
which instead considers projects. Malik and Dustdar do not formally describe their own 
privacy policy, which also differs from the work in this thesis. However, Malik and 
Dustdar do identify some privacy requirements that are similar to the privacy rules 
introduced in this thesis. The work by Malik and Dustdar is complementary to this thesis, 
as they describe issues related to access control, while this thesis considers information 
usage and provides extended features through the CPM. 
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2.7 Addressing Privacy Challenges 
Privacy by Design (PbD) is a concept that has recently been embraced by privacy 
regulators as a solution for privacy problems in the digital world [69]. PbD is a term 
developed by Ann Cavoukian, the Information and Privacy Commissioner in Ontario, 
Canada [12]. PbD is defined as "an engineering and strategic management approach that 
commits to selectively and sustainably minimize information systems' privacy risks 
through technical and governance controls" [69]. The philosophy behind the PbD 
approach is that privacy must be embedded directly into the design specification of 
technologies being developed [12]. The PbD approach says privacy should be considered 
from the creation of software, and not added on as an afterthought when the software is 
complete. In order to take privacy protection into consideration when software is still in 
its design phase, it is important to have a set of guidelines and approaches that can be 
followed. 
In order to discover guidelines for PbD, in 2011 a first of its kind report prepared for the 
European Commission's Directorate-General Justice reviewed the privacy impact 
assessment (PIA) methodologies of seven countries and ten PIA case studies [84]. This 
report created a Privacy Impact Assessment Framework (PIAF) that has been hailed as a 
"landmark for PbD" [69] because of the solutions it provides to the challenges of 
designing privacy solutions. In this section, these solutions are discussed along with how 
they are addressed in the collaborative privacy architecture presented in this thesis. 
2.7.1 Domain Specific Legislation 
The PIAF suggests utilizing any available specific legislation and/or privacy principles of 
the domain for which the software is being developed, as privacy goals when designing a 
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privacy solution. This domain specific legislation can be rules created internally within 
an organization, or created externally through government regulation. When domain 
specific privacy legislation is not available, the PIAF suggests using the FIP of the OECD 
as the starting point for determining privacy protection goals. 
In the collaborative privacy architecture presented in this thesis, privacy policies are 
created to define how private information can be shared between individuals in 
collaborative environments. These privacy policies are founded on a set of generic 
concepts that are common to all domains that use the collaborative privacy architecture. 
This generic privacy policy is based on the FIP of the OECD, therefore providing a 
baseline level of privacy protection even if no domain specific principles are introduced. 
However, the privacy policies used in the privacy architecture presented in this thesis are 
defined within an ontology that is designed to be extendable with domain specific 
concepts. This allows any domain specific legislation that may be required to be included 
in the privacy policies. 
2.7.2 Safeguarding Personal Information 
The PIAF also suggests that personal information should be provided safeguards through 
the usage of data avoidance and purpose-specific processing. Data avoidance suggests 
that private information should only be used when it is required and should be isolated 
from other pieces of private information. Purpose-specific processing suggests that 
personal information should only be used for a specific reason, and not all reasons are 
valid excuses to use personal information. 
To address these concerns, each piece of information within the collaborative privacy 
architecture presented in this thesis that wishes to be accessed is provided a privacy rule 
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that addresses how this access may be done. This privacy rule requires a purpose to be 
given for the allowable use of the information. This ensures that a record exists stating 
what purposes for information use the information owner has permitted, and that the 
information provider is informed how their information will be used by others. 
2.7.3 Providing Transparency 
Another suggestion of the PIAF is that PbD solutions should include the goal of 
providing transparency regarding information subjects. The idea is that it should be clear 
who has been provided with someone else's private information. This idea is of particular 
concern in the CWE domain, as the environment requires individual interactions between 
many different people. 
This concept is a goal of this thesis and is addressed through the use of ontologies to 
define the privacy policies of collaborating individuals. The ontology allows for the 
relationships between private information providers and collectors according to which 
privacy rules to be inferred. This ability allows for an information provider to be aware of 
who has access to their information, and for what reasons, at all times during 
collaboration. This ability is particularly useful during collaboration where new 
individuals can leave and enter the system during runtime. 
2.7.4 The Right to be Informed 
The PIAF also suggests PbD solutions comply with the right of information owners to be 
informed, to object to the processing of their data, and to access, correct, and erase 
personal data. This right to be informed is a type of transparency provided to information 
owners, and like the transparency provided over who has access to one's personal 
information as discussed in Section 2.8.3, this ability is provided within our architecture 
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through the relationships within the privacy ontology. The ability of an ontology to 
determine information allows for an information provider to make requests about the 
current use and status of their information. The architecture relies on Privacy 
Administrators (PAs) who exert a level of control over the collaborative environment. If 
conflicts or issues arise over the status or modification of personal information, a PA can 
be notified to rectify the issue. 
2.8 Architectural Impacts on Privacy 
How a software system deals with privacy relies heavily on the architecture of that 
system. There are two main architectural choices that can be made by the designer of a 
system that are of the most importance to how privacy can be provided: the degree of 
personal identifiability, and the degree of network centricity [70]. 
The degree of personal identifiability is defined as the degree to which personal 
information can be linked directly to an individual. Low identifiability can be achieved 
by entering information anonymously into a system (e.g., e-voting), or only using 
information that is common to many individuals (e.g., age). High identifiability occurs 
when the information itself is linked to an individual (e.g., a credit card number), or when 
information is entered as part of an individual's account (e.g., a student's information at a 
school). 
The degree of network centricity describes how much the software system relies on a 
networked infrastructure to provide its required services. Low network centricity exists 
when a client has control over the system, and relies little on any networked abilities. 
High network centricity exists in highly networked systems where the client lacks 
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immediate control over their system, and where a network operator is able to know 
information about a client. 
From these two metrics, two privacy approaches are available: Privacy-by-Architecture, 
and Privacy-by-Policy [70]. Privacy-by-Architecture is an approach that lacks the 
traditional use of notice and choice surrounding privacy. For example, a privacy-by-
architecture approach can be taken by an organization that by design, opts to not collect 
private information or to only collect private information through non-identified 
transaction mechanisms. Such a system would have low personal identifiability. Another 
way of providing privacy-by-architecture would be for an organization to design their 
system to allow the use of personal information, but to have this information limited by 
the architecture to a client-side system. In this second case, the system would have low 
network centricity. Privacy-by-architecture approaches are security-heavy solutions, in 
that information is protected through traditional security mechanisms (i.e. passwords, 
encryption, etc.). 
In this thesis we deal with CWEs, which limits the abilities required for privacy-by-
architecture. Depending on the type of collaborative environment, the degree of personal 
identifiability can vary depending on how much personal information is required. 
However, it is not possible to create a CWE with low network centricity, as by design 
collaborative environments link an individual to many other individuals. In such cases 
where there is a high degree of personal identifiability and/or network centricity, a 
privacy-by-policy approach is required. Privacy-by-policy provides individuals with 
notice and choice surrounding their private information, in order to provide individuals 
with a level of control over how their information is to be used. Because of the 
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requirements of CWEs, privacy-by-policy is the approach taken in the collaborative 
privacy architecture presented in this thesis. 
2.9 Approaches for Separate Issues of Privacy 
As described in the previous section, the work in this thesis is concerned with creating a 
privacy-by-policy approach to privacy protection. This approach is suitable for highly 
networked collaborative environments and provides solutions for many issues of privacy. 
This approach allows for specific privacy problems to be addressed, such as providing 
collaborating individuals with control, knowledge and choice when dealing with private 
information. However, there are different approaches taken by works found in the current 
literature. Astorga et al. [7] have described a privacy enhancing architecture for CWEs. 
This work presents a security-based approach to privacy protection, through a modified 
Kerberos [48] symmetric key protocol. This security and cryptography based architecture 
for privacy seeks to solve the issues of unauthorized access and eavesdropping, and to 
protect against modification by unwanted third parties [7]. The architecture for privacy in 
collaborative environments presented by Astorga et al. [7] does not present an alternative 
solution to the architecture presented in this thesis. Instead, it aims to solve a separate set 
of issues entirely. This mutual exclusivity of privacy goals is due to the complexity and 
ambiguity of privacy, as previously described in Section 2.2. Therefore, the work by 
Astorga et al. [7] is complementary to the work in this thesis, and it could be used to 
enhance the architecture presented in this thesis. Such an enhancement would solve 
security problems that are outside the scope of the architecture created in this thesis. 
31 
 
 
 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter presented a literature survey on the topics of collaboration and privacy. A 
background on CWEs was presented, which described how these environments are used, 
and what strengths and weaknesses they provide. The concept of privacy was also 
described, and a definition of privacy to be used in this thesis was outlined. The concerns 
of providing privacy in collaborative environments were also presented. There is a body 
of work which uses collaboration as a tool in providing privacy in other domains. These 
approaches were presented and discussed because many of the concepts and ideas they 
describe can be translated to the collaborative domain itself. Other approaches to 
providing privacy within the domain of collaborative environments were also presented. 
What similarities and differences these approaches have compared to the architecture 
presented in this thesis were discussed. By presenting these different approaches, the 
novelty of the architecture presented in this thesis was highlighted. This examination 
showcased many important factors that must be taken into account in the domain of 
CWEs. 
This chapter also described different types of privacy challenges that are present 
depending on the type of system being examined. How these challenges are addressed by 
the privacy architecture presented in this thesis were described. The discussion in this 
chapter provided many of the goals that the privacy architecture in this thesis strives to 
achieve. These goals include: 
 To provide privacy mechanisms for the non-client centric situation of CWEs. 
 To provide privacy through technically enforceable default policies that are also 
customizable. 
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 To provide user access, modification rights, and transparency through the use of 
ontologies built into the architecture. 
 To provide easy to understand data handling through the use of the ontology and 
an assisting CPM service provided within the architecture. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Collaborative Privacy Architecture 
In this chapter, the collaborative privacy architecture is presented. The architecture's 
layers, components and interacting actors are shown in Figure 3.1. The architecture 
consists of three types of actors, five physical layers, and one logical layer. In Figure 3.1, 
the ellipses represent temporary components that exist only during runtime of the 
environment. These runtime components are created both by the collaborative system in 
use and the administrators in charge of the domain, depending on the component. Some 
runtime components are required to be created at domain initialization time, while others 
can be added to the domain while it is in use. The squares in Figure 3.1 represent those 
components that persist in the environment, before, during and after runtime. In this 
chapter, the different types of actors who interact with the system are discussed. Each 
layer is also presented and discussed, with a description of what components exist in each 
layer and what the function of each component is. One significant component within the 
introduced architecture is the privacy policy. This privacy policy is used by collaborators 
to outline how they wish their private information be used. The privacy rules and 
elements that comprise a privacy policy are also introduced, along with the reasoning for 
their selection and use in this thesis. Another noteworthy component to be introduced in 
this chapter is the privacy and collaboration ontologies. These ontologies allow the 
system to dynamically infer how access to private information should be handled within a 
collaborative environment. 
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Figure 3.1. Layers, Components and Actors within the Collaborative Privacy Architecture 
3.1 Interacting Actors 
As shown in Figure 3.1, there are three different actors who interact with the 
collaborative privacy architecture: Privacy Administrators, Domain Administrators, and 
Users. 
 Users - Users are the regular collaborating individuals that utilize the 
collaborative environment in order to interact with each other and accomplish 
tasks. A User could also represent an organization, project or group. 
 Privacy Administrator (PA) - Multiple PAs can be assigned to handle the privacy 
administrative tasks within the collaborative environment. PAs can be utilized for 
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each of the organization, groups and projects in order to handle the privacy 
concerns for each collection of users. The PAs are able to interact with the 
Privacy Layer, allowing the PA in charge of the organization to customize the 
privacy ontology for a specific domain. The PAs of groups and projects are tasked 
with deciding what the members of these collections are required to know from 
each other and how this information should be used. For example, if the domain 
involved is required to protect or provide private information through legislation, 
a PA can create privacy policy rules that ensure this domain-specific legislation is 
satisfied. The PA relieves this responsibility of creating these group-wide, project-
wide or organization-wide requirements from individual collaborators, which 
reduces the number of errors made by individuals when creating their own 
privacy policy rules. 
 Domain Administrator (DA) - The DA is able to interact with the Collaboration 
Layer and is in charge of coordinating the collaboration between users. The DA is 
in charge of creating any required groups or projects for an environment, and 
assigning the required roles to users. 
3.2 Privacy Layer 
The goal of the Privacy Layer is to determine which private information is to be protected, 
who has access to this information, what reasons they wish to use the information, and 
for how long the information will be in use. In order to accomplish this goal, a privacy 
policy is defined. This privacy policy contains one-to-many privacy rules which each 
define the proper usage of a piece of private information. These privacy rules contain a 
set of privacy elements. Each privacy element is important in order to properly express 
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how private information should be managed. The privacy policies are described in this 
thesis using a Generic Privacy Ontology (GPO). The GPO is one of four components that 
are contained in the Privacy Layer. The other three components are a set of conflict 
engine rules, descriptions of privacy guidelines, and a Collaborative Privacy Manager 
service definition. Each of these components is described in this section, along with an 
explanation of how the privacy elements, rules and policies are defined. 
3.2.1 Privacy Elements, Rules and Policies 
In order to allow the users in a collaborative environment to define how they want their 
private information to be protected, a privacy policy for collaborative environments must 
be applied. In this thesis, the most basic parts of this privacy policy are the individual 
privacy elements. These privacy elements are designed to build privacy rules that can be 
general enough to form rules that cover many collectors, while retaining the ability to be 
specific to a single collector if needed. The privacy elements selected in this thesis are 
based on the FIP developed by the OECD, which were described in Section 2.3.1. The 
FIP of the OECD were used as the basis of the privacy elements due to the widespread 
use of the FIP in many privacy guidelines and technologies [2][15]. The privacy element 
selection process is described below and summarized in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. Selection of Privacy Elements from OECD Principles 
 
 Collector - The Use Limitation and Openness principles require the identity of the 
individuals who are allowed access to the private information be specified. This 
ensures that the proper individuals not only gain access to the information, but 
also ensures that they are available for further questions and challenges related to 
their information collection. From these two principles it was determined that the 
collector of the information must be defined as a privacy element. In a CWE, 
where collaborators are divided into groups, projects and organizations, these 
classifications could be used to assist the collector element. Privacy rules can be 
created to tailor to an entire group, project or organization. 
 Information - The most commonly referenced item throughout the OECD 
guidelines is the information that is to be shared. Nearly every OECD principle 
contains some mention of the idea that the individuals who are having information 
collected must be made aware of what private information is included in the 
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collection. From this it becomes clear that whatever type of private information is 
requested for collection must be defined. 
 Retention - Another requirement mentioned in multiple privacy principles deals 
with the idea of time. Collection Limitation states that there should be limits 
placed on the information collection, time being one such limit. Similarly, in 
order to keep the information up-to-date, as specified in the Data Quality principle, 
the age of the information must be specified. An agreed upon retention time 
would allow the appropriate length of time for storage and use of the collected 
information to be specified. This would also allow the provider of information to 
specify a time to which the information should be forgotten. 
 Purpose - The Data Quality, Purpose Specification and Openness principles all 
require that the reasons for which the information is to be collected must be 
detailed. By outlining a purpose for the data collection, it can be assured that the 
possible uses of the data are known to the collaborators. 
Collector, information, retention and purpose are the four selected privacy elements. A 
privacy rule is defined as a set of the four privacy elements. Each privacy rule provides 
an explanation of how a piece of private information is to be handled in one situation. 
Each of the four privacy elements are used to create conditions that must be met in order 
to satisfy the OECD FIP, and as such the term "condition" is used in this thesis to refer to 
the requirement of these elements being addressed. A different privacy rule is required 
for each piece of information and for each situation where that information should be 
treated differently. As such, a privacy policy consists of one-to-many privacy rules 
together. 
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Figure 3.3. Concepts and Relations of the Generic Privacy Ontology (GPO) 
3.2.2 Generic Privacy Ontology (GPO) 
In this section, we present our Generic Privacy Ontology which was created for this 
thesis to address the needs of representing privacy requirements within a CWE. Our GPO 
contains the minimum, most general concepts required for privacy protection within a 
CWE, and these concepts may be extended to address the specific needs of a 
collaborating domain. The different components that compose an ontology are: concepts, 
properties, relations, functions, instances, and axioms [45][80]. A concept is a collection 
of objects to be modelled in the ontology (e.g. an Organization can be modelled as a 
concept). Concepts are shown in Figure 3.3 as rounded rectangles, which is a common 
approach to illustrating concepts. Properties are primitive values (string, integer, etc.) that 
describe attributes of concepts if required. A relation is an interaction between two 
concepts (e.g. the relation hasProject between the concepts Organization and Project) or 
between a concept and a property of that concept [42]. Our GPO does not contain any 
properties as its concepts are meant to remain generic, however extended concepts could 
be created with properties if they so required. A property is generally illustrated as a 
rectangle. Relations are represented in Figure 3.3 as arrows going from one concept (the 
40 
 
 
 
domain) to another (the range), as arrows are a common approach to illustrating relations 
within an ontology. A relation between a concept and a property would indicate the name 
of the property, which the domain being the concept instance and the range being the 
value of the property. A function is a special type of relation, where the nth element in the 
relationship is uniquely determined by the preceding elements (e.g. the is-a relationship is 
a function) [42]. An instance is a specific example of a concept in the domain. Concepts 
may have sub-concepts, and any relation involving a parent concept is valid for the 
parent's sub-concepts. For example, in Figure 3.3 there is the relation collectorIsSubject 
between the concepts PrivacyPolicyRule and Subject; the relation collectorIsSubject 
would also be valid between the concepts PrivacyPolicyRule and Organization. Finally, 
an axiom is an explicit rule in first-order logic that is used to place constraints on the use 
of concept instances. Axioms are used to model true statements about concepts. 
 Axiom → Relation(Concept1, Concept2) [27] 
Figure 3.3 shows our GPO, which defines how private information is to be handled 
according to privacy policies. The GPO represents a privacy policy as a concept (the 
PrivacyPolicy concept). A privacy policy is able to have a number of privacy rules, where 
each rule describes the allowed access to a piece of private information. Privacy policy 
rules are also represented in the GPO as concepts (the PrivacyPolicyRule concept). A 
privacy rule is associated to a privacy policy in the GPO through a relation (the hasRule 
relation). By representing these concepts and relations in the GPO, the environment is 
able to infer who has access to what private information according to which privacy rule. 
The ontology also contains conditions created by the information provider on the ability 
to collect information. These conditions are also represented in the GPO as concepts 
41 
 
 
 
(Retention, Purpose, Information, and the collecting Subject concepts). Access is only 
allowed once the information collector has stated their intended purpose for the 
information use, and the length of time they will use the information. These conditions 
must match with what the information provider has stated are acceptable. 
The Node concept in the GPO represents any collaborative individual who communicated 
with other individuals. The term Node is used as the concept name to differentiate 
between the individual using the environment, and their representation in the 
environment. The Node concept can be extended into sub-concepts to handle the different 
kinds of actors, including the PAs, DAs, and different types of users. Each Node is 
assigned a role within the organization, based on its function and position. This 
organizational role is identified by the concept OrgRole. Based on their OrgRole, Nodes 
are assigned to Groups. A Group is a collection of one or more OrgRoles, and is created 
to bring together individuals with similar abilities. There can be specific privacy 
protection required in a group, for example to allow everyone within a Group to see each 
other's office address. The creation of privacy rules for a Group allows those rules to be 
shared between members of that Group. 
Nodes can also be assigned roles to accomplish a project. This project role is identified 
by the concept NodeProjectRole. Based on their NodeProjectRole, Nodes are assigned to 
the appropriate project. A Project is a collection of Nodes working together for a 
common task. There can be specific privacy protection within a Project, similar to the 
protection within a Group. 
An Organization is a collection of Groups that are governed by the same body. An 
Organization may have regulations that apply to every User who belongs to it. 
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A Participant is a third party organization that may interact with the CWE. Participants 
join a CWE in order to collaborate within projects, and are given a ParticipantRole in 
order to indicate which projects. Nodes may belong to a Participant. 
The use of privacy policies that can cover many people allows for the simplification of 
privacy policy creation for individuals. The creation of privacy policies can be difficult, 
and in dynamic environments such as CWEs where the environment and roles of an 
individual can change, the amount of work required to keep a privacy policy adequate 
individually could become overwhelming. Allowing an administrator to create privacy 
rules that address concerns shared by a collection of users reduces an individual's work. 
With the concepts of the GPO introduced, a representative ontological structure of the 
GPO will now be provided. This formal structure is included in this thesis in order to 
clearly state the concepts of the ontology and the relations between them. This in turn 
allows the architecture to be better described for future implementations. There are many 
different representative ontological structures that can be used to define an ontology [80]. 
In this thesis, a general ontology is formally represented as a 3-tuple and is shown in 
Definition 1. 
Definition 1 - Representative General Ontological Structure 
O = (C, P, R). An ontology O can be represented as a 3-tuple, where C is a finite set of 
concept instances C = {C1, C2, …, Cn}, P is a finite set of property instances P = {P1, 
P2, …, Pn}, and R is a finite set of generic relation instances R = {R1, R2, …, Rn}. 
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 A relation instance Ri is able to associate two concept instances Cj and Ck, or a 
concept instance Cj and a property instance Pk. In the case of associating two 
concept instances, Ri(Cj, Ck), while in the case of associating a concept instance 
and a property instance, Ri(Cj, Pk). As an example of a relationship between a 
concept and a property, we could have an instance of a Data concept named 
Data1 which has the property 100. The relationship value could then link the 
instance to its property, value(Data1, 100). 
As the GPO is a specific build of an ontology, the representative ontological structure of 
the GPO will build off the general formalization shown in Definition 1. The formal 
representation of the GPO is shown in Definition 2. This new definition provides further 
details about the structure of the GPO. 
Definition 2 - Representative Ontological Structure of the GPO 
GPO = (S, Pjr, Ogr, In, Rt, Pu, Pa, Ppr, Pp, P, Rp). The GPO is an 11-tuple, where 
the finite set of concept instances C in Definition 1 has been divided into a distinct set of 
sub-concepts, C = {S ∪ Pjr ∪ Ogr ∪ In ∪ Rt ∪ Pu ∪ Pa ∪ Ppr ∪ Pp}. This division of 
the general set of concepts C into more specific subsets allows for a better understanding 
of what concepts are required by the Generic Privacy Ontology. 
 S = {Og ∪ Pj ∪ G ∪ N}. S is a finite set of subject concept instances, which is 
made up of any instance of a concept that may be allowed to collect private 
information according to a privacy rule, where Og is a finite set of Organization 
concept instances Og = {Og1, Og2, …, Ogn}, Pj is a finite set of Project concept 
instances Pj = {Pj1, Pj2, …, Pjn}, G is a finite set of Group concept instances 
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G = {G1, G2, …, Gn}, and N is a finite set of Node concept instances N = {N1, 
N2, …, Nn}. 
 Pjr = (Par ∪ Npr). Pjr is a finite set of ProjectRole concept instances, which is 
made up of any instance of a concept that is used to assign Nodes to a project, 
where Par is a finite set of ParticipantRole concept instances Par = {Par1, 
Par2, …, Parn}, and Npr is a finite set of NodeProjectRole concept instances 
Npr = {Npr1, Npr2, …, Nprn}. 
 Other sets of concept instances in the GPO include: Ogr is a finite set of OrgRole 
concept instances Ogr = {Ogr1, Ogr2, …, Ogrn}, In is a finite set of Information 
concept instances In = {In1, In2, …, Inn}, Rt is a finite set of Retention concept 
instances Rt = {Rt1, Rt2, …, Rtn}, Pu is a finite set of Purpose concept instances 
Pu = {Pu1, Pu2, …, Pun}, and Pa is a finite set of Participant concept instances 
Pa = {Pa1, Pa2, …, Pan}. 
 Ppr is a finite set of Privacy Policy Rule concept instances Ppr = {Ppr1, Ppr2, …, 
Pprn}, where each Ppri has a relation to a Rtj, Puk, Sl and Inm. 
 The final set of concept instances is Pp, a finite set of Privacy Policy concept 
instances Pp = {Pp1, Pp2, …, Ppn}, where each privacy policy instance contains a 
finite set of privacy policy rules Ppi = {Ppr1, Ppr2, …, Pprn}. 
 Where the R in Definition 1 is a set of general relation instances, in Definition 2 
Rp is defined as a set of relation instances specific to the privacy ontology. 
Rp = {allowedBy(Ni, Pprj), belongsToGroup(Ogri, Gj), belongsToOrg(Gi, Ogj), 
belongsToParticipant(Ni, Paj), belongsToProject(Pjri, Pjj), 
belongsToSameGroup(Ogri, Ogrj), collectorIsSubject(Ppri, Sj), 
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createsProjectRole(Pji, Pjrj), hasGroup(Ogi, Gj), hasMember(Gi, Ogrj), 
hasNode(Pai, Nj), hasNodeProjRole(Ni, Nprj), hasOrgRole(Ni, Ogrj), 
hasParticipantRole(Pai, Parj), hasProject(Ogi, Pjj), hasRule(Ppi, Pprj), 
hasRulePurpose(Ppri, Puj), hasRuleRetention(Ppri, Rtj), hasSubjectInfo(Si, Inj), 
hasSubjectPolicy(Si, Ppj), purposeConflict(Pui, Puj), requiresInfo(Ini, Inj), 
requiresPurpose(Pui, Puj), retention(Ppri, Rtj), ruleConflict(Ppri, Pprj), 
ruleProjectsInfo(Ppri, Inj), subGroupOf(Gi, Gj)} 
The use of ontologies in this collaborative privacy architecture presents a number of 
advantages. The ontology uses a reasoning engine to infer who has access to what 
information, and according to what privacy rules. This inference enables the management 
of situations where changes in the collaboration domain environment may occur. Privacy 
differs from access control in that someone who has access to information is still required 
to follow designated conditions which describe the proper information usage. By 
determining what information an individual has access to according to what privacy rule, 
the access to the private information is checked twice. The first check determines if there 
is the proper allowed access, while the second check determines if the proper usage 
conditions have been agreed to. The inference of privacy rule allowance is done 
whenever there is a significant change to the system, such as a new user entering the 
system, a new project creation, or a change in role. The semantic rules used for inference 
are described using a semantic language and stored in the Infrastructure Layer accessed 
by the architecture. This provides the architecture with adaptability in order to address 
different domains as the rules can be added to or modified if required by a domain. 
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3.2.3 Conflict Engine Rules 
This component outlines how conflicts can be detected between privacy rules within the 
domain ontology. Conflict rules are run against the domain ontology in the Application 
Layer to check for conflicting privacy rules. A privacy rule (modelled as concept Ppr) is 
composed of four elements: a collecting subject (modelled as any sub-concept of S), the 
private information (modelled as concept In), purpose for use (modelled as concept Pu), 
and retention time of the information (modelled as concept Rt). A specific privacy rule is 
modelled in the domain ontology by creating an instance of each of these concepts, and 
linking the Ppr instance to each element instance through a relationship (i.e. 
collectorIsSubject, ruleProtectsInfo, hasRulePurposes, hasRuleRetention). It is possible 
for conflicts between privacy elements to exist between privacy rules. Conflicts cannot 
exist between privacy rules due to the information element, since it is valid to have 
multiple rules addressing a single piece of information. It is similarly valid to have 
multiple privacy rules addressing a single collector. However, conflicts between privacy 
rules may exist in the remaining two privacy elements: purpose and retention. 
The purpose element within a privacy rule is designed to be domain specific. This allows 
for different domains to tailor how information can be used to the requirements of the 
domain. It is possible to create purposes within a domain that are mutually exclusive. In 
such a case, a user should not be able to have a rule that allows access to information for 
both of the mutually exclusive purposes. Due to the generality of the purpose concept, it 
cannot be determined automatically which purposes are in conflict. This determination is 
therefore left to the PA, who is also in charge of determining what purposes are required 
for the domain. The PA designates which purposes conflict at domain creation time 
through the use of the purposeConflict relation. As shown in Figure 3.1 and listed in the 
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set R in Definition 2, the relation purposeConflict exists in the privacy ontology with the 
domain and range being instances of the purpose concept Pu. For example, if purpose 
instances Pu1 and Pu2 conflict, the PA would add to the R set in the domain ontology the 
relation purposeConflict(Pu1, Pu2). 
Retention Rt is the second privacy element that may cause two privacy rules to conflict. 
This element creates a conflict that is straight forward: a user should not be able to access 
information for the same reasons for different lengths of time. If two such rules exist, 
they are in conflict with each other. Unlike the purpose concept, the retention concept 
does not need a relation to define which retentions are in conflict, as the concept 
represents a measurable length of time and therefore two instances of retention can be 
directly compared (e.g. is Rt1 < Rt2). 
As shown in Figure 3.1 and listed in the set R in Definition 2, there exists within the GPO 
a relation called ruleConflict which has the domain and range being instances of the 
PrivacyPolicyRule concept Ppr. This ruleConflict relation is used to designate which if 
any privacy rules are in conflict with each other. For example, if privacy policy rule Ppr1 
and privacy policy rule Ppr2 conflict with each other, the relation ruleConflict(Ppr1, Ppr2) 
would be created. This relation is searchable and can be found by a privacy administrator, 
who will be tasked with resolving any conflict. 
3.2.4 Collaborative Privacy Manager Definition 
This component describes the Collaborative Privacy Manager (CPM). This description 
contains the structure of the CPM, and any functionality created for the domain by the PA. 
It is based on this definition that domain instances of the CPM are created and exist at 
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runtime in the Application Layer. Multiple domain instances of the CPM can be created 
to meet the demand that currently exists in the Application Layer. 
3.2.5 Privacy Guidelines 
There are often privacy guidelines that must be considered when a collaborative 
environment is deployed. These guidelines can be pieces of legislation passed by the 
government where the collaborative environment is being used. It is also possible there 
are industry or organizational guidelines that exist over the collaborative system. For 
example, a large organization may take it upon itself to draft regulations on how private 
information should be treated within that organization. What privacy guidelines and 
legislations that must be followed is highly domain dependant. As such, these guidelines 
are not built directly into the system or generic privacy ontology. Instead, the guidelines 
required are placed in the privacy layer, and it is the task of the PA to develop privacy 
rules to meet these demands. 
3.3 Collaboration Layer 
The focus of this thesis is on providing privacy protection for collaborative environments. 
The work carried out in this thesis was designed to work in conjunction with a separately 
developed collaboration framework developed by Kamoun et al. [32]. This collaboration 
framework focuses on creating quality communication while collaborating in 
dynamically changing contexts [32] and exists within the collaboration layer. The 
collaboration layer as presented in this section is required to establish a collaborative 
working environment where privacy can be considered. However, the collaboration 
framework presented in this section is not original nor the main focus of this thesis. 
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The collaboration layer ensures the interoperability between the organizational needs 
expressed in the application layer and the actual implementation in the messaging layer. 
This layer provides a collaboration ontology that enables users who belong to different 
groups and projects to communicate inside sessions where they can send and receive data 
through data flows. The representation of these sessions and data flows is independent of 
their implementation. As such, this implementation of sessions and data flows may be 
done with any suitable technology, which is contained in the messaging layer. Thus, the 
main issue in this layer is to determine which data flows have to be created in order to 
enable the needed communication. This layer contains a Generic Collaboration Ontology 
(GCO) [32] which details the structure of one or more collaborative sessions. New 
instances of this ontology are generated after every context change in the application 
layer such as arrivals, changing roles, and changing groups of collaborating individuals. 
Similar to the advantages provided by the GPO as described in Section 3.2.2, ontologies 
were chosen to represent the GCO because they are a high level representation of 
business concepts and relations that allows for knowledge reuse and sharing, reasoning, 
and inference. 
3.3.1 Generic Collaboration Ontology (GCO) 
This ontology details the structure of one or more collaborative sessions. This ontology 
determines which data flows have to be created in order to enable the needed 
communication. The GCO as originally proposed by Kamoun et al. [32] describes how 
the users of a group are organized within sessions where they can send and receive data 
flows. This ontology that represents the GCO is shown in Figure 3.4. As with the GPO, in 
Figure 3.4 the proposed concepts are represented by rounded rectangles, while relations 
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are represented as arrows going from one concept (the domain) to another concept (the 
range). 
The main concept of the GCO is Session. A session is a set of flows, represented by the 
concept Flow, which represents communication links between users. There is a relation 
hasDataType between the concept Flow and the concept DataType. Possible values that 
are captured by an instance of the DataType concept are text, audio, video or an 
exchanged artifact between participants. During the collaborative activities, flows are 
exchanged between communicating individuals represented by the Node concept. A node 
is hosted by a physical machine represented by the Device concept (relation 
hostingDevice). For example, a node can represent a specific graduate student at the 
university, while the device concept can represent that student's laptop or PDA. Therefore, 
Flow is related to Node by the two relations: source and destination, representing the 
source node and the destination node respectively. A given node plays one or more roles, 
and these roles determine the types of activities for all involved participants. Depending 
on their roles, individual collaborators can have multiple tasks and will need to 
communicate with different members organized within different groups in order to 
achieve a collaborative goal. 
Each role belongs to one or several groups. Therefore, the concept Role is related to the 
concept Group by the relation belongsToGroup. In order to manage collaborative 
sessions, a set of sessions must be defined for each group. Therefore the relation 
hasSession relates the Group concept to the Session concept. The session definition for 
each group enables a valid deployment of appropriate sessions depending on the roles 
and groups of the individuals. 
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Figure 3.4. Concepts and Relations of the Generic Collaboration Ontology (GCO) [32] 
Nodes manage exchanged data flows using external components deployed in the same 
devices in order to enable the separation between collaboration code (implemented in the 
external components) and the business code (which is specific to the application and 
implemented in the components of each individual). To this end, the manages relation is 
used to link the Component concept to the Flow concept. Components have the same data 
type of the managed flows (relation hasDataType). Each component is deployed on one 
device (relation isDeployedOn which links Component and Device). The type of each 
component depends on the handled data type (text, audio, video, files, artifacts, etc.) and 
on the communication mode (real-time communication, asynchronous communication). 
3.4 Application Layer 
The application layer models a business view of the collaborating users and the relations 
between them. The business view is application-dependent, so it must be built by the 
designers of each collaborative system and instantiated at runtime by the system itself. It 
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contains the domain specific ontology in use during runtime of a collaborative 
environment. This domain ontology is an extension of the generic ontologies (GPO and 
GCO) with terms specific to an application category, such as business-specific concepts 
and relations. Any other services or components required by a specific domain could also 
exist in this layer. 
3.4.1 Domain Collaboration Application 
The collaborative privacy architecture shown in this thesis is intended to be domain 
independent. This independence means that the architecture is not concerned with what 
software application is used by the domain to create the CWE. This is important as 
different organizations often use different CWEs [66]. There are a number of commercial 
and open source products available which are able to create a CWE. Popular commercial 
products include BSCW [58], IBM Sametime [29], Kavi Workspace [34], and Microsoft 
SharePoint [47]. Available open source products include PHPGroupware [65] and Tiki 
Wiki CMS Groupware [76]. Any front end software that allows participation in a CWE 
can be compatible with the collaborative privacy architecture. 
3.4.2 Domain Ontology 
This ontology is an amalgamation of the GPO and GCO with domain specific elements. 
These domain specific elements are extensions on the general concepts provided by the 
generic ontologies. For example, the GPO contains an Information concept, which is the 
information to be protected by a privacy rule. This general Information concept can be 
extended for the specific types of information the domain requires. The complexity of the 
domain ontology is determined by the requirements of the domain. 
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The main generic elements that can be specialized are: Node, Group, Project, OrgRole 
and ProjectRole, Information, Purpose, Retention and hasSession. The concept Node can 
be specialized into sub-concepts specifying the type of communicating individual if 
required by the domain. Similarly, the Group concept can be specialized into sub-
concepts if the domain requires different types of groupings. Similar to Group, the 
Project concept may be specialized into sub-concepts if different types of projects are 
required by the domain. OrgRole is specialized by defining all possible roles that can be 
assigned to each Node. The ProjectRole concept (and its sub-concepts) are customized by 
the Organization when the project is created. These project specific roles are designed to 
outline the functions required to complete projects. The Purpose concept is specialized 
depending on the domain, as the reasons for information collection within that domain 
can be specified. The Retention concept is specialized in order to allow for different 
lengths of time to be defined, depending on the requirements of the domain. The 
Information concept is also specialized depending on the domain, as the types of 
Information used within the domain are detailed. The relation hasSession has to be 
specialized in order to define the needed collaborative sessions for each group. Therefore 
the domain ontology contains hasSession sub-concepts that inherit rules from their parent 
concepts that indicate how nodes can communicate, within the specified sessions. 
Instances of GCO concepts, GPO concepts, and those of the domain ontology are 
regrouped into the same instance in this model. This instance represents a business view 
of the collaborative activities with privacy in consideration. The GCO and GPO overlap 
in the concepts of Node, Role (OrgRole) and Group, and the Session concept is related to 
the Project concept similar to its relation to the Group concept. 
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At runtime, the domain ontology is instantiated when a change in the environment is 
detected by the domain collaboration application (such as the arrival or departure of a 
user, or role change of a user), thus providing a knowledge base containing explicit and 
implicit collaborative aspects about the collaborators, their roles, their groups, their 
projects, the needed communication sessions for each group and project, and which 
privacy policy rules are relevant to which members of the environment. This instantiation 
uses the Reasoning Layer to determine the privacy protection of the system, as well as the 
sessions required for collaborative communication between users. Rules trigger the 
instantiation of the generic ontology allowing a semantic-driven adaptation that enables 
managing spontaneous sessions and detecting implicit potential collaborative situations. 
An example of an implicit potential collaborative situation is as follows. An administrator 
adds a session to a group, followed by defining application rules based on the 
organization roles. In this example, the administrator defines the rule that OrgRole1 and 
OrgRole2 will communicate in this session. Once this is complete, any participants who 
have those roles of OrgRole1 and OrgRole2 will automatically join this newly created 
session. For another example in terms of privacy, an administrator assigns to a 
collaborator a NodeProjectRole belonging to an existing Project. The collaborator will 
automatically join the project, and be allowed to access to any information defined by 
privacy rules that cover that project, conditional on the reasons for the information use. 
3.4.3 Domain Collaborative Privacy Manager 
The Domain Collaborative Privacy Manager (DCPM) is a domain specific instance 
which runs in the form of a transparent service to provide information to the Users in 
order to assist with the protection of their privacy. The DCPM interacts with the Domain 
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Ontology in order to determine what rules and requirements a User may require. Multiple 
DCPM services can exist in the Application Layer through replication in order to meet 
demand if a large number of users are present or in case of different projects run 
simultaneously [49]. 
3.4.4 Conflict Engine 
The Conflict Engine is utilized by the DCPM to check for conflicts between the privacy 
rules of privacy policies. As described in Section 3.2.3, there are a set of conflict engine 
rules that when executed, determine if any privacy rules are in conflict. The conflict 
engine is a semantic reasoning engine which is able to execute these semantic conflict 
rules. The conflict engine is able to generate a set of axioms which identify which rules 
are in conflict. These axioms are added to the domain ontology, where a PA can be 
alerted to the conflict and take appropriate action. 
3.5 Reasoning Layer 
The reasoning layer is a logical layer utilized in order to make explicit the implicit 
knowledge contained in the domain ontology. The Reasoning Layer involves the use of 
the components in the Collaboration Layer, Domain Layer, Messaging Layer and Privacy 
Layer, with the exception of the Collaboration Privacy Manager Definition. The 
Reasoning Layer triggers the instantiation of the generic ontologies into a combined 
domain ontology to allow for the managing of spontaneous sessions and detecting 
implicit potential collaboration situations (for the collaboration ontology), and checking 
access and allowances according to privacy rules contained in the privacy policy (for the 
privacy ontology).The application layer models a business view of the collaborating users 
and the relations between them (in groups and projects). 
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An inference process occurs when a change to the environment is made. Examples of 
such a change include the addition of a new user to the system, the creation of a new 
group, or the creation of a new privacy rule. When a change is detected, a semantic rule is 
executed by the reasoning layer to determine if any new information relevant to the 
system can be inferred. For example, when a new privacy rule is added to a user's privacy 
policy, the reasoning layer uses semantic rules to determine who is allowed access to the 
information covered by the new rule. Each privacy policy rule allows access to a piece of 
private information according to who is making the request and the conditions of use 
included in the request. As an example, the process carried out by the reasoning layer 
after the creation of a new privacy rule is described below: 
1) For a privacy rule, in a privacy policy, belonging to an information provider 
 2) Find who the collector identified in the rule is 
 3a) If the collector is an organization 
  4a) Find each organizational role that assigns users to this organization 
  5a) Create the allowedBy relation between all users with these 
  organizational roles and the privacy rule 
 3b) Else If the collector is a group 
  4b) Find each organizational role that assigns users to this group 
  5b) Create the allowedBy relation between all users with these 
  organizational roles and the privacy rule 
 3c) Else If the collector is a project 
  4c) Find each project role that assigns users to this project 
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  5c) Create the allowedBy relation between all users with these project 
  roles and the privacy rule 
 3d) Else If the collector is an individual 
  4d) Create the allowedBy relation between this individual and the privacy 
  rule 
There are three steps that are executed in order to carry out the process of inferring 
knowledge through the ontology. These steps are an interaction between the domain 
ontology, the semantic rules, and the semantic reasoning engine. Each of these steps 
require time to execute. 
The first step is to transfer the knowledge within the domain ontology and the semantic 
rules to the reasoning engine. This process transfers all the ontological concepts, 
properties and instances stored in the ontology, along with the semantic rules, to the 
reasoning engine. 
Once all the required information has been transferred to the reasoning engine, the second 
step is the actual inference process. This step executes the semantic rules over the 
ontology knowledge according to the reasoning engine. The result of this step is a set of 
inferred axioms. As discussed in Section 3.2.2, axioms are used to model statements that 
are true, and these axioms represent new knowledge that was not previously contained in 
the domain ontology. 
The final step is to transfer the new inferred knowledge in the form of axioms back to the 
domain ontology. Once this transfer is complete, the inferred knowledge within the 
ontology becomes indistinguishable from the information that was contained in the 
domain ontology before the inference. 
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3.6 Messaging Layer 
The Messaging Layer ensures communication between users within a collaborative 
environment. It is in charge of implementing collaborative sessions as determined by the 
collaboration ontology. The messaging layer provides a communication model that masks 
low-level details about what technology is in use to communicate (e.g. TCP, UDP, IP, 
etc.) and allows for the creation of a secure, authenticated communication channel. The 
concept of the Messaging Layer is also shared with a previous work [32], as the work in 
this thesis was designed to be compatible with it. The components of the Messaging 
Layer have been adapted in this thesis to also address the new tasks required by the 
collaborative privacy architecture. 
3.6.1 Deployment Service Manager 
This manager finds the required business services for each user interacting with the 
collaborative environment. If a collaborating user requires a service that is missing, such 
as a service required by the environment to communicate, the service is deployed at the 
application layer from the service catalogue for use by the user. This manager is also 
responsible for deploying instances of DCPMs to the application layer. The deployment 
of the DCPM can be made to specific projects or groups to isolate their requests, which 
further helps to protect privacy within the collaboration. When a DCPM is no longer 
required, the deployment service manager can remove it from the application layer. 
3.6.2 Session Manager 
This component is responsible for managing, creating, and deleting different sessions as 
required. In our work, these sessions are considered stateless. If an administrator wishes 
to keep a record of the sessions, it will require an auditing solution which is outside the 
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scope of this thesis. A session allows for the secure communication between individuals 
who are given certain roles by the DA. The use of sessions also helps to protect privacy 
by limiting the exposure of communication between collaborative users. 
3.6.3 Channel Manager 
This component is responsible for managing and delivering exchanged data flows 
between multiple users. The data flows exist within a session, and the Channel Manager 
interacts with the Session Manager in order to ensure the proper communication. Flows 
allow for secure communication channels to be established, which provides an 
opportunity for encryption and a level of privacy-by-architecture protection. 
3.7 Infrastructure Layer 
The Infrastructure Layer is the lowest layer of the architecture, and it contains the 
hardware necessary to run the collaborative environment. 
3.7.1 Environment Configuration 
This storage is used to save configuration files associated with the design and setup of the 
collaborative environment. This is information about the environment itself, such as the 
network configuration, login credentials and permissions, and any log files. The 
information stored in this location is solely about the environment and not the private 
information pertaining to individuals. 
3.7.2 Message Catalogue 
The many different types of messages that can be sent within the collaborative 
environment are stored in the message catalogue. These message types are custom made 
and define the structure of the messages sent during runtime of the architecture. For 
example, there are messages for collaborative functions that do not deal specifically with 
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privacy, such as to connect to the collaborative system. However there are many 
messages that deal with privacy. For example, a message to get a privacy policy can be 
sent to a user in order to see what privacy rules they current have in place. An 
acknowledgement message would be sent in response to this request, and the 
acknowledgement message would contain a list of all the privacy rules the user current 
has in place, as described in the domain ontology. Creating a catalogue with message 
structures allows the system to recognize what type of message is being sent or received. 
The Message Catalogue does not contain copies of the messages being sent through the 
architecture, only the definition and structure of each message type. 
3.7.3 Ontology Repository 
This repository is deployed to store the generic collaboration and generic privacy 
ontologies according to an ontology language. There are a number of available ontology 
languages that can be selected for this task, including CycL [16], DOGMA [78], Gellish 
[21], IDEF5 [38], KIF [72], and OWL [68]. The collaborative privacy architecture 
presented in this thesis is domain independent, and the decision of what ontology 
language should be used is determined by what language best suits the need of the 
domain. Any domain specific ontologies that are created may also be stored in the 
ontology repository. 
3.7.4 Service Catalogue 
The service catalogue contains the services that are available for use within the 
collaborative environment. The Service Catalogue consists of two parts, the Business 
Service Catalogue and the Technical Service Catalogue. The Business Service Catalogue 
contains services that are offered to the users to accomplish business, or domain specific 
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goals within the collaborative environment. The Technical Service Catalogue contains 
services which are required in order to complete internal goals and management. The 
services contained within the Technical Service Catalogue are not available to end users 
in a business view. 
3.8 Summary 
The focus of this chapter was the introduction of the collaborative privacy architecture. 
The different types of actors who interact with the architecture were described, along 
with their responsibilities and abilities. The privacy components of the architecture were 
then presented, including an introduction to how privacy policies are defined in this thesis. 
The components of a privacy policy were explained, including the privacy elements and 
privacy rules. The other layers of the architecture were introduced and described, with 
details provided on the many concepts that are contained at each layer. This chapter also 
introduced the generic privacy and collaboration ontologies which are used to discover 
new knowledge within the architecture. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Collaborative Privacy Architecture Design 
With the layers and components that compose the collaborative privacy architecture 
described, the next step is to outline the data flows between the layers. In this chapter, the 
interactions between the layers of the collaborative privacy architecture are described. 
This description is given through a use case diagram and its involved scenarios. Each use 
case within the diagram is provided with a description of its function, and a step-by-step 
outline of the actions performed in the use case. The scenarios outline different situations 
that can occur during execution of the CWE, and through these scenarios the data flow of 
the collaborative privacy architecture is demonstrated. 
4.1 Use Case 
The use cases for the collaborative privacy architecture are performed by the three actors 
in the environment: the Privacy Administrator (PA), the Domain Administrator (DA), 
and the User. Figure 4.1 shows the three actors and the use cases they perform. 
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Figure 4.1. Available Use Cases for Actors within Collaborative Privacy Architecture 
4.1.1 Use Case: Create Privacy Rule 
Brief Description 
The PA creates a new instance Ppr of the PrivacyPolicyRule concept, and any new 
instances of Information (In), Purpose (Pu), Retention (Rt) required by the rule. These 
new instances, Ppr, In, Pu, and Rt, are added to the domain ontology. 
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Step-By-Step Description 
Before this use case is carried out, the PA has received a request to add a new privacy 
rule. This request can come from an individual User if that User wishes to create a more 
fine-grained policy for themselves. The request may also come from the design of the 
domain. For example, if a new User is added to the system, that User may require 
PrivacyPolicyRule instances to be added to their PrivacyPolicy based on any existing 
organization, group or project privacy rules. 
1. The PA creates an instance of the user information if it does not already exist in 
the domain ontology. 
2. The PA creates an instance in the domain ontology of the purpose required for the 
privacy rule. 
3. The PA creates an instance in the domain ontology of the retention time for the 
privacy rule. 
4. The PA creates an instance of the new privacy rule, and uses relations to link it to 
the previously created information, purpose and retention, as well as to the user's 
privacy policy. 
5. With the new PrivacyPolicyRule created, the domain ontology is instantiated and 
the rule engine is executed to determine what other users are allowed access to 
information based on the new rule. 
4.1.2 Use Case: Define Privacy Ontology 
Brief Description 
The PA extends the concepts contained in the privacy ontology to fit the requirements of 
the domain where the collaborative environment is being utilized. As described in 
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Section 3.4.2, the concepts of Node, Group, Project, OrgRole and ProjectRole, 
Information, Purpose, Retention and hasSession may be extended. 
Step-By-Step Description 
The PA completes this use case once the business requirements of the domain have been 
developed. This use case is completed before collaboration has begun, and is one of the 
first use cases completed. 
1. Based on the business requirements of the domain, the PA creates sub-concepts 
within the privacy ontology. 
2. The concepts of Node, Group, Project, OrgRole and ProjectRole, Information, 
Purpose, Retention and hasSession are all available for the addition of sub-
concepts. 
3. The privacy ontology with custom sub-concepts is saved in a suitable ontology 
language. 
4. The privacy ontology is executed in the Application Layer as the domain ontology. 
4.1.3 Use Case: Delete/Edit Privacy Rule 
Brief Description 
The PA deletes or modifies an instance of a privacy rule from the domain ontology. As 
collaborative environments are dynamic, the tasks within the environment are subject to 
change. As such, privacy rules may need to be removed or modified as changes occur. 
Step-By-Step Description 
The PA completes this use case after receiving a request to remove or edit a privacy rule. 
This request can come from an individual user who wishes to remove or change one of 
their privacy rules, or it can come from a change in the environment. An example of a 
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change in the environment could be the deletion of a project. In such a case, all the 
privacy rules created in regards to that project would be removed by the PA. 
1. The PA searches the ontology for the rule which is the subject of the request. 
2. Once the rule is found, it is edited or deleted as stated by the request. 
3. Any condition instances (information, purpose, retention) that are now 
unnecessary are removed. 
4.1.4 Use Case: Change User Group/Project 
Brief Description 
The DA modifies which groups or projects a user belongs to. This changing of a group or 
project may occur during runtime due to the dynamic nature of CWEs. 
Step-By-Step Description 
This use case is completed after a request has been received by the DA to change a group 
or project a User belongs to. This request can come from an individual user who wishes 
to join a group or project, or it can come from a change in the environment. An example 
of a change in the environment could be the removal of a project. In such a case, a set of 
Users who were previously a part of the deleted group would be modified. 
1. The DA decides if it is appropriate to add the requested User to the group or 
project stated in the request. 
2. If the request is denied, a message is sent to the requesting User informing them 
of the denial. 
3. If the request is accepted, the DA searches the ontology for the group or project 
which is the subject of the request. 
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4. The role or roles required to place a User in the requested group or project are 
discovered. 
5. The User is given the appropriate roles to place them in the required group or 
project. 
4.1.5 Use Case: Add Group/Project 
Brief Description 
The DA adds a new group or project to the domain ontology. This addition of a group or 
project may occur during runtime due to the dynamic nature of CWEs. 
Step-By-Step Description 
This use case is carried out once a DA decides a new group or project is required to meet 
the commitments of the domain. 
1. The DA creates a sub-concept within the group or project concept for the new 
group or project if none of the current sub-concepts are suitable. 
2. The new group or project is created within the domain ontology. 
3. The DA assigns a role which allows the appropriate Users to join the group or 
project. If no suitable role currently exists, a new role is created within the domain 
ontology to perform this action. 
4.1.6 Use Case: Delete/Edit Group/Project 
Brief Description 
The DA deletes or modifies a group or project within the domain ontology. As projects 
are completed, projects and groups may no longer be required and can be deleted or 
modified. 
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Step-By-Step Description 
The DA decides that a change is required to an existing group or project. 
1. The DA searches the ontology for the group or project which must be changed or 
removed. 
2. The modification to the group or project is carried out. 
3. Any roles that are no longer required within the domain ontology due to the 
modification are removed as necessary. 
4.1.7 Use Case: Send Privacy Rule Request 
Brief Description 
The User makes a request for the addition of a new Privacy Rule. This addition can be 
related to the addition of new information for the User, or the User may simply wish to 
share more than is given to them by any group, project or organization rules. 
Step-By-Step Description 
The User decides that they require an additional privacy rule. 
1. The User enters into the GUI of a DCPM (usually included in the domain 
collaboration application) what privacy rule they would like added to their 
privacy policy. 
2. The DCPM sends a create privacy rule request to the PA. 
4.1.8 Use Case: Request Join Group/Project 
Brief Description 
The User makes a request to join an existing group or project. This request can be made 
in order to collaborate with and assist other Users. 
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Step-By-Step Description 
The User decides that they require access to a current group or project. 
1. The User uses an appropriate service within the application layer (such as, the 
domain collaboration application) to create a request to be added to an existing 
group or project. 
2. The request to be added to a group or project is sent to a DA. 
4.1.9 Use Case: Communicate/Collaborate 
Brief Description 
A User interacts with other Users in the CWE. This use case is the general purpose of the 
CWE. It is in this action that Users are able to share ideas, work and information. 
Step-By-Step Description 
Before this use case is carried out, the User has been given the appropriate roles by a DA 
to assign them correctly in the collaborative environment. The User has also had their 
privacy policy created upon the entrance to an organization, group and/or project. The 
User has been correctly connected to the collaborative environment. 
1. The User is able to use the domain collaboration application and any 
communication services the domain provides to send messages and communicate 
with other users in their organization, group and projects. What form the 
communication takes is dependent on the domain of the CWE. 
4.1.10 Use Case: Request Information 
Brief Description 
A User requests personal information belonging to another User. This task involves one 
User attempting to access the private information of another User. 
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Step-By-Step Description 
Before this use case is carried out, the User has been given the appropriate roles by a DA 
to assign them correctly in the collaborative environment. The User has also had their 
privacy policy created after entering the organization, group and/or project. The User has 
been correctly connected to the collaborative environment. 
1. The User makes a request for a piece of private information through the domain 
collaboration application. The request includes the target User, the target User's 
type of information, why the requesting User wants it (their purpose), and how 
long the requesting User requires this information (the retention time). 
2. When the request is received in the application layer of the collaborative privacy 
framework by a DCPM, a check is first made against the domain ontology to see 
if the requesting User has been given the allowance to access the information. 
This is determined by an allowedBy relation in the domain ontology. If an 
allowedBy instance does not exist between the requesting User and a rule 
allowing access to the information, the access request is denied. 
3. If the allowedBy relation does exist between the requesting User and a privacy 
rule protecting the requested information, a second check is performed. The 
purpose and retention conditions provided by the User are compared to the 
purpose and retention information contained in the privacy rule that allows access. 
If these comparisons are found to not be acceptable, the User is informed of the 
reason their conditions failed. 
4. If the conditions are found to be acceptable, the requested information is retrieved 
by the domain collaboration application and sent to the requesting User. 
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4.1.11 Use Case: View Privacy Policy 
Brief Description 
A User requests to see their current privacy policy. A User is able to view their own 
privacy rules contained in their privacy policy. This knowledge benefits the ability of a 
User to protect their own privacy. As CWEs are dynamic and privacy rules may be added 
to a User's policy during runtime, an updated privacy policy is returned from the domain 
ontology in order to be viewed. 
Step-By-Step Description 
Before this use case is carried out, the User has been given the appropriate roles by a DA 
to assign them correctly in the collaborative environment and has correctly connected to 
the environment. The User has also had their privacy policy created upon the entrance to 
an organization, group and/or project. 
1. The User makes a request to view their privacy policy. This request is made 
through the domain collaboration application and received by a DCPM. 
2. The DCPM has access to the domain ontology and searches for the PrivacyPolicy 
concept instance that is related to the requesting User. 
3. The DCPM retrieves the set of PrivacyPolicyRule instances associated with the 
discovered PrivacyPolicy instance. 
4. The information linked through relations to the PrivacyPolicyRule instances (the 
name of the information, the purpose associated with the rule, the retention time 
of the rule, and the Users who are allowed access to the information) is formatted 
by the DCPM into a format more convenient to read for the User. 
5. The readable privacy policy information is sent by the DCPM to the domain 
collaboration application to be received by the original requesting User. 
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4.2 Use Case Scenarios 
With the abilities the actors may perform now defined, it is important to express how the 
layers of the collaborative privacy architecture interact. As shown in Figure 3.1, the 
collaborative privacy architecture contains five physical layers and one logical layer. 
These described layers are highlighted in this subsection through sequence diagrams. The 
sequence diagrams shown in this subsection are represented in UML notation, but 
indicate the interaction between actors and layers, rather than objects as specified in 
formal UML sequence diagrams. These descriptions and diagrams are used to show the 
data flow between the layers to create a better understanding of the collaborative privacy 
architecture. The first sequence diagram that is shown in this subsection describes the 
actions taken during initial domain setup. As the Application Layer contains runtime 
components, this layer does not exist at the beginning of this sequence diagram. However 
it is created through the actions of the administrators. All the other layers shown in the 
initial domain setup interaction exist before and after the runtime of the Application 
Layer components. The sequence diagrams shown after the initial domain setup diagram 
all take place while the system is running. As such, the Application Layer is shown to 
exist at the beginning of these interactions since the system is assumed to be running 
when the actions begin.  
4.2.1 Initial Domain Setup 
The DA establishes the domain collaboration ontology, by creating extensions to the 
general collaboration concepts as required by the domain in question. Similarly, a PA 
establishes the domain privacy ontology by extending the privacy concepts to include 
domain appropriate concepts. It is at this point that these actions of the administrators 
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create the first components within the Application Layer and the Application Layer 
begins to exist. The required users are created by the DA as instances of the Node 
concept in the ontology. Each user instance is given its appropriate roles to be organized 
into whichever groups and projects are required. At this point, the Collaboration Layer is 
able to use the Reasoning Layer to infer what flows and sessions are required to establish 
communication between the users. The PA creates the first privacy rules that apply to any 
current organization, group, or project. These privacy rules are applied to each user 
within the organization, group or project, as determined by the roles of the user. The 
Privacy Layer is informed that new privacy policies have been completed. The Privacy 
Layer uses the Reasoning Layer to infer who has access to what information, according 
to what privacy rule. This resulting inference creates a set of axioms which are passed 
back to the Application Layer where they become a part of the Domain Ontology. The 
User is now informed what roles they have been given, what their privacy policy is, and 
what their current access is. The Users are now able to collaborate freely. This process is 
shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Sequence of Events during an Initial Domain Setup 
4.2.2 Addition of New User 
The addition of a new user involves several layers and actors, and is shown in Figure 4.3. 
The DA creates a new Node instance to represent the new user in the environment. The 
new user instance is given any group or project roles as required by the initial status of 
the user. These roles are determined by the requirements of the user at the discretion of 
the DA. The addition of a new user with roles triggers a DCPM within the application 
layer to assign any organizational, group or project rules to the new user's privacy policy. 
The DCPM assigns to the new user any required privacy rules based on which groups, 
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projects and organization the user has joined. Next, inferences must be made to determine 
who has access to the new user's information and what information the new user has 
access to. This is done through a request to the Privacy Layer, which in turn executes the 
semantic rules to infer the new knowledge. This rule execution results with a set of 
axioms that describe what information relationships the new user now has. These inferred 
rules are added to the new user's privacy policy as defined in the domain ontology. 
Application Layer Privacy Layer Reasoning Layer
Domain 
Adminstrator (DA)
Inform Change
User
Inform of New User
Create User Instance
Inform of Roles
Assign Roles
Inform Access, Roles, and Privacy Rules
Request Semantic
Rule Execution
Execute Rules
Inform Results
Update Results
Update Domain Ontology
Assign Privacy Rules
 
Figure 4.3. Sequence of Events during the Addition of a New User 
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4.2.3 Addition of a New Privacy Rule 
Figure 4.4 outlines the sequence of events that take place between the layers of the 
collaborative privacy architecture when a new privacy rule is created. A PA receives a 
request to create a new privacy rule. This request can come from an individual user, or 
can be part of a group, project or organization definition. The privacy administrator has 
access to the privacy ontology, and creates a new instance of a privacy rule. This instance 
of a privacy rule is added to the current domain privacy ontology. The DCPM at the 
application layer informs the Privacy Layer that a change has been made. The Privacy 
Layer in turn uses the Reasoning Layer to execute the semantic rules to infer who is 
allowed access by this new privacy rule. This inference results in a set of axioms, which 
are sent to the Application Layer where they are integrated into the Domain Ontology. 
Application Layer Privacy Layer Reasoning Layer
Privacy 
Administrator (PA)
User
Request New Rule
Send Rule Request
Create Rule Instance
Add Instances
Inform of Changes
Request Semantic
Rule Execution
Execute Rules
Inform Results
Update Results
Update Domain Ontology
 
Figure 4.4. Sequence of Events during the Addition of a New Privacy Rule 
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4.2.4 Deletion of a Privacy Rule 
The scenario of deleting a privacy rule begins with a message sent to the PA requesting a 
rule to be deleted. This request can come from an individual user, or can be received after 
the deletion of a group or project. The sequence diagram shown in Figure 4.5 shows the 
scenario where a user requests the removal of a privacy rule. The PA has access to the 
privacy ontology, and finds the instance of the privacy rule in question. The discovered 
privacy rule is removed from the current domain privacy ontology. Finally, the user who 
has had the privacy rule deleted is informed of the result. 
Application Layer
Privacy 
Administrator (PA)
User
Request Rule Deletion
Send Deletion Request
Submit Rule Deletion
Remove Rule from Domain Ontology
Inform of Rule Deletion
 
Figure 4.5. Sequence of Events during the Deletion of a New Privacy Rule 
4.2.5 Information is Denied, Not the Correct Allowance 
A request is made by a user to access a piece of information. The DCPM checks the 
allowedBy relations of the requesting user. In the scenario shown in Figure 4.6, it is 
determined by the DCPM that no allowedBy relation exists between that information and 
user. The requesting user is informed of the denial. The DCPM records the denial for 
possible reference at a later time. 
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Information Request
check allowedBy
Record Failure
Inform Denial
 
Figure 4.6. Sequence of Events when Information is Denied due to Incorrect Allowance 
4.2.6 Information is Denied, Not the Correct Conditions 
A request is made by a user to access a piece of information. The DCPM checks the 
allowedBy relations of the requesting user. The scenario shown in Figure 4.7 differs from 
the previous scenario shown in Figure 4.6, as the allowedBy relation is determined in this 
case to exist between the requesting user and the requested information. The original 
request sent by the user is designed to contain a set of conditions the requestor is 
suggesting for the information usage. As introduced in Section 3.2.1, the term condition 
refers to the privacy elements within a privacy rule that are used to address privacy 
concerns. The DCPM compares the purpose and retention conditions given by the 
requesting user within the information request message to the purpose and retention 
conditions contained in the privacy rule that had been previously found through the 
allowedBy relation. In the scenario shown in Figure 4.7, the DCPM determines at this 
point that the conditions do not match. The DCPM sends a message back to the 
requesting user informing them of the condition mismatch, and records the failed attempt 
for future reference. 
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Figure 4.7. Sequence of Events when Information is Denied due to Incorrect Conditions 
4.2.7 Information Request is Accepted 
After showing the two types of failures that can occur when information is requested, 
Figure 4.8 shows the steps taken when an information request is successful. First, a 
request is made by a user to access a piece of information. The DCPM checks the 
allowedBy relations of the requestor and determines that access is allowed according to a 
privacy rule. The DCPM then compares the conditions given by the requestor in the 
request message to the conditions found in the privacy rule. In this scenario, the DCPM 
finds that the conditions are acceptable. The DCPM in the Application Layer then uses 
the appropriate communication protocol as described in the Messaging Layer, to access 
the information. This information is retrieved and sent back to the DCPM, which 
forwards it directly to the User through the domain collaboration application. 
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Figure 4.8. Sequence of Events during a Successful Information Request 
4.2.8 User is Added to a Group or Project 
The DA receives a request to add a user to a project. This request can be made by an 
individual user, or can be made after the creation of a new project. The DA must approve 
of the addition of the user to the project. Once this approval has been granted, the DA 
assigns the user the required project roles to assign them to the requested project. The 
next step is carried out by a DCPM where any privacy rules shared by the project are 
added to the individual user's privacy policy. In the next step, the DCPM informs the 
Privacy Layer of the change. The Privacy Layer executes a set of semantic rules at the 
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rule engine to determine who has gained access to the new user's information, and what 
information the new user has access to. This result is determined by a set of inferred 
axioms. This result is passed back to the Application Layer, where the results are added 
to the Domain Ontology. The user now added to the project is informed of the result, 
including their new access, their new roles, and any new privacy rules that have been 
added to their privacy policy. The scenario described here and shown in Figure 4.9 
describes the process for adding a user to a project. When adding a user to a group the 
process is the same, but instead of assigning project roles, the user would be assigned 
organizational roles. 
Application Layer Privacy Layer Reasoning Layer
Domain 
Adminstrator (DA)
Inform Change
User
Request Addition to Project
Inform of Roles
Assign Roles
Inform Access, Roles, and Privacy Rules
Request Semantic
Rule Execution
Execute Rules
Inform Results
Update Results
Update Domain Ontology
Inform Request
Assign Privacy Rules
 
Figure 4.9. Sequence of Events when a User is Added to a Project 
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4.3 Summary 
The goal of this chapter was to explain and highlight the interactions that take place 
between the layers of the collaborative privacy architecture. This was done first by 
showing and explaining the many use cases the actors using the collaborative privacy 
architecture are able to perform. These use cases were outlined, with focus placed on 
explaining the purpose of the use case, the conditions that trigger the use case, and a 
description of the steps that take place during the use case. The second half of this 
chapter focused on use case scenarios. These scenarios were described and shown with 
the goal of explaining how the layers of the collaborative privacy architecture interact 
and what interactions occur between them. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Collaborative Privacy Manager 
The collaborative privacy architecture shown in Figure 3.1 introduced the idea of the 
Collaborative Privacy Manager (CPM) and Domain Privacy Collaborative Manager 
(DCPM). In this chapter, these ideas are further explained with details of their purpose 
and implementation. This chapter is based on the work first presented in [3]. The CPM is 
the definition of the manager service, while the DCPM is a service running at the 
Application Layer which is available to assist Users. First described in Sections 3.2.4 and 
3.4.3, this chapter aims to further the understanding of this service. In this section the 
architecture of the CPM is shown and discussed, with the basic functionality of the CPM 
detailed. The CPM is designed to handle dynamic issues of privacy, in order to 
complement the privacy ontology in the architecture, which expresses static concepts and 
relations required for privacy. The job of providing privacy is difficult for many 
collaborators, so the CPM is tasked with making this process easier and more effective. 
Multiple DCPMs may exist within the Application Layer in order to meet high demand if 
required, and to provide separate service to different groups and projects. 
5.1 Collaborative Privacy Manager Architecture 
In this section the Collaborative Privacy Manager (CPM) is introduced through a 
description of its architecture. The definition of the CPM architecture is kept at the 
privacy layer of the collaborative privacy architecture, as described in Section 3.2.4. 
However when the service is replicated and made available for use by a user at runtime, it 
exists as a DCPM within the Application layer as described in Section 3.4.3. During 
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runtime, the architecture takes advantage of the domain ontology which also exists within 
the Application Layer, as described in Section 3.4.2. The architecture of the CPM is 
divided into several distinct levels. Figure 5.1 shows the DCPM, its architecture, and the 
other components it interacts with in the Application Layer. 
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Figure 5.1. Architecture of the Domain Collaborative Privacy Manager 
5.1.1 User Interface 
The User Interface Level as shown in Figure 5.1, allows the users and administrators 
within the CWE to interact with a DCPM. It is through the user interface that users are 
able to be given information, instruction, and alerts related to their privacy in the 
environment. The user interface will allow users to view their own privacy policy, and 
make requests for changes or additions if required. The user interface is provided through 
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the domain collaboration application as shown in Figure 3.1 and described in Section 
3.4.1. In order to have this functionality, the DCPM is designed to be integrated into the 
domain collaboration application through its Application Requirements Level, which will 
be described in Section 5.1.4. Depending on the requirements of the domain, the DCPM 
service may also provide its own user interface that exists at the Application Layer which 
would allow users direct access to the service. As described in Section 3.2.1, the task of 
outlining an entire privacy policy is challenging for a layperson due to the complexity of 
privacy. PAs who are assigned to create privacy policies for an entire organization, group, 
or project are able to perform these tasks through the user interface of the DCPM. The 
DCPM is designed to have additional functionalities that a standard user does not have 
access to, such as adding and removing privacy rules from the domain ontology. 
5.1.2 Domain Ontology 
The DCPM and the Domain Privacy Ontology both exist at the Application Layer, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. The Privacy Management Level interacts with the Domain Privacy 
Ontology in order to gather the knowledge contained in the ontology, and to modify the 
ontology with new knowledge. As described in Section 3.4.2, the Domain Privacy 
Ontology is extended with privacy elements specific to the requirements of the CWE in 
use. 
5.1.3 Privacy Management Level 
The Privacy Management Level contains knowledge specific to the CWE. The Global 
Privacy Policies module contains privacy policies that govern many collaborators. These 
policies fall into three categories: organization, group or project. Organizational policies 
are applied to all users who work under the same organization. Group policies cover 
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groups or sub-groups of users, while project policies cover users from different groups 
and possibly organizations who are collaborating to complete a task. As described in 
Section 3.2.2, users are assigned to groups based on their organizational roles, and 
assigned to projects based on their project roles. The global policies are created by PAs in 
charge of each organization, group and project. Each global privacy policy can be created 
prior to any users entering the CWE. 
The Personal Privacy Policies module contains privacy policies that govern individual 
collaborators. These policies outline how each user is allowing access to their private 
information. Rules contained in the personal privacy policy consist of those applied from 
the organization, group and project levels, as well as rules created based on the input of 
the individual user. Privacy rules contained within an individual's privacy policy may be 
altered at runtime during the collaboration when requested by the user. 
The Privacy Policy Planner is in charge of creating policy examples and generating 
helpful advice for users. These results are passed to the user interface where the user is 
able to provide input and feedback. As users enter a CWE, they have already been 
assigned to the appropriate organization, groups and projects by the DA. Each 
organization, group and project can each bring its own privacy rules that will be applied 
to the user's own privacy policy. The Privacy Policy Planner has access to the Global 
Privacy Policies module, allowing it to determine what rules should be added to a new 
user's own policy on behalf of the organization, group or project. The Privacy 
Management Level also includes a Privacy Rules module. The Privacy Rules are a 
translation of the privacy both the global and personal privacy policies that have been 
translated into a machine readable format using a semantic language. 
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5.1.4 Application Requirements Level 
The Application Requirements Level contains modules that must be directly built into the 
domain collaboration application the collaborators use to access the CWE, as described in 
Section 3.4.1. The Application Requirements Level contains a privacy monitor module 
which is designed to have direct access to the message exchanges occurring as the user 
collaborates with others. It is tasked with monitoring the incoming and outgoing 
messages, gathering the privacy related messages (based on the message type), and 
sending these messages to the Enforcement Environment Levels where decisions are 
made. 
5.1.5 Enforcement Environment Level 
The Enforcement Environment Level contains the decision making processes of the 
DCPM. These modules are intended to provide each DCPM with the ability to make 
decisions without the need for direct intervention of a human. The Privacy Analyzer is 
the first module in this decision making process. This module's task is to parses the 
message that is supplied by the Privacy Monitor. The analyzer should distinguish who the 
message pertains to, compare this to previously analyzed messages if necessary, and pass 
the results to the Privacy Planner module. An example of this process could be the 
comparison of a failed information request to previous failed information requests. 
The Privacy Planner module is tasked with taking the input from the Privacy Analyzer, 
and deciding what outcome should result for a given situation. Continuing the example of 
a failed information request, the Privacy Planner module could decide that since a high 
number of requests have failed, the user whose information is being requested should be 
notified. This would make the notified user aware that there is a demand for a certain 
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piece of their information, allowing the user to make the information available if they 
wish. 
The Privacy Executor is the final designed step in the decision making process of the 
Enforcement Environment Level. This module is tasked with taking the decision that was 
made by the Privacy Planner and encoding it into the correct format so the decision can 
be carried out by the appropriate software in the current domain. Continuing the failed 
information request example, the Privacy Executor could send a message alerting the user 
to the high number of failed information requests to the user interface. 
A separate module that can also be in this level is the Anonymization module. In some 
outcomes, information is required to be anonymized, or masked in some fashion. As this 
functionality is not required in every situation, this module would exist separate from the 
Privacy Executor. There are a number of different approaches this can be done such as k-
anonymity [25] and l-diversity [81], each approach having its own strengths and 
weaknesses. Allowing this module to be plugged in rather than built in allows different 
anonymization approaches to be selected based on domain specific requirements. 
5.2 Summary 
In this chapter, a detailed look at the proposed CPM was presented. The architecture of 
the CPM, consisting of a number of levels and components was discussed. This chapter 
also examined the interaction between components within a level and the interaction 
between different levels. The features provided by a deployed DCPM allow for 
interaction between collaborating users and the collaborative privacy architecture. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Case Study and Implementation 
In this chapter, a case study involving different organizations who wish to collaborate 
while following privacy regulations is presented. The collaborative environment used in 
this chapter is that of a university which is working with a hospital. These two 
organizations fall under different legal jurisdictions, and as such this example can draw 
from two different legal obligations when considering what privacy rules must be created. 
Using this collaborative environment, different scenarios are carried out as collaboration 
takes place between the two organizations. The collaboration in this case study is carried 
out on collaboration software, with the collaborative privacy architecture working as a 
back end to handle their privacy concerns. The objective of this case study is to highlight 
the role of the collaborative privacy architecture in allowing successful collaboration 
while upholding privacy regulations and providing privacy protecting mechanisms. 
6.1 Case Study 
In this section a case study is presented to illustrate how privacy protection can be 
provided for collaboration between different organizations. This case study is shown 
through a number of different scenarios handled by the privacy architecture. Each of 
these scenarios takes place within the same collaborative environment. As mentioned in 
Section 3.2.4, the Privacy Layer of the Collaborative Privacy Architecture contains a set 
of privacy guidelines that the PA may use to develop privacy rules. This is required as 
different organizations often provide privacy protection according to different privacy 
guidelines. Some organizations may develop their own guidelines, such as the Online 
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Privacy Alliance, a coalition of more than 80 organizations which have developed their 
own set of privacy guidelines [56]. Some organizations may rely on guidelines created by 
other organizations, such as the privacy guidelines of the OECD [60]. While still other 
organizations may follow government legislation, such as those described in Section 2.3. 
The collaborative environment in which the scenarios in this chapter will take place is 
that of a university and hospital within the province of Ontario, Canada. Universities in 
Ontario follow the privacy guidelines described in the Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) [22], while hospitals in Ontario must additionally 
follow the privacy guidelines of the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) 
[23]. The case study in this section involves a research project between a university and 
hospital in Ontario. As such, the legislation FIPPA and PHIPA are consulted as the 
available privacy guidelines. Involved in this research project are health care custodians 
from the hospital, and researchers and graduate students from the university. A custodian 
in the health care domain is a health care practitioner who has control of a patient's 
private information. Collaboration application software is utilized in order to facilitate 
communication and shared work between the project members, and this software works 
with the collaborative privacy architecture to handle privacy protection of the private 
information in use. DCPMs are hosted on the university's collaboration server, and 
interactions with a DCPM is carried out by users through a client-side interface which 
can be integrated into the collaboration software. The DCPM and collaboration software 
exist in the Application Layer of the Collaborative Privacy Architecture, as shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
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The collaborative privacy architecture as shown in Figure 3.1 is used to address the 
privacy concerns of this collaboration. There is a PA in charge of each different 
collection of users (organizations, groups and projects) within the collaborative 
environment. The participants in this collaboration are shown in Figure 6.1. In Figure 6.1, 
the CWE is shown as a rounded box, organizations are shown as rectangular boxes, 
groups are shown as ellipses, projects are shown as dashed ellipses, and individual 
collaborators are shown as stars. The individuals that are collaborating within the 
research project are shaded grey. 
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Figure 6.1. CWE Scenario involving a University and a Hospital 
 
6.1.1 Privacy Ontology Creation 
The privacy ontology in this thesis has been constructed using the Protégé Ontology 
Editor and Knowledge Acquisition System developed by Stanford University [71]. The 
Protégé tool is first used to create the generic privacy ontology. This generic privacy 
ontology contains the privacy concepts and relations that are shared among all situations. 
For the case of the university and hospital collaboration scenario, the generic privacy 
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ontology is extended through the Protégé tool. This extension creates the domain specific 
privacy ontology, which contains concepts and relations specific to this case. 
The created privacy ontologies must be saved in a knowledge representation language, in 
this case the Web Ontology Language (OWL). OWL is selected due to it being a W3C 
standard, and because OWL is written in XML. XML allows the OWL privacy policies to 
be exchanged easily between different computers and different operating systems [79]. 
OWL is a vocabulary extension [8] of the Resource Description Framework (RDF) [9]. 
This extension improves the machine interoperability of RDF, while significantly 
increasing its semantic abilities through a larger vocabulary and improved syntax [79]. 
6.1.2 Collaborative Privacy Manager 
The CPM is deployed on the collaboration server as one or more Domain Collaborative 
Privacy Managers (DCPMs). The collaboration server also hosts the domain 
collaboration application. Collaborating users interact with a DCPM through a client 
front end, which can be built into the domain collaboration application. As shown in 
Figure 6.2, each DCPM consists of three packages: Communication, Connection and 
OWL Manager [4]. 
 
Figure 6.2. Software Packages Present within the CPM 
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The Communication Package 
The Communication package contains all the different message types that are required to 
be sent between the client and server. This package is an implementation of the message 
catalogue located in the Infrastructure Layer of the collaborative privacy architecture, as 
shown in Figure 3.1. Different messages contain different parameters that are required for 
the completion of the task involved. Each message type is differentiated by an ID, which 
allows the receiving client or server to determine what to do. Each message in the 
Communication Package has a corresponding acknowledgement message, which alerts 
the message sender to the results of their request. 
The Connection Package 
The Connection package contains the software that handles the creation of a connection, 
and the sending and receiving of messages between the collaboration server and clients. 
The Connection Package contains the ability to accept an incoming connection request, to 
authenticate any request, to create a communication path between the client and server, to 
send messages, and to receive messages. This package is an implementation of the 
Channel Manager and Session Manager, located in the Messaging Layer of the 
collaborative privacy architecture, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
The OWL Manager Package 
The OWL Manager package contains the software which implements the functions of the 
CPM. This is an implementation of the CPM Definition in the Privacy Layer of the 
collaborative privacy architecture, as shown in Figure 3.1. When deployed, this definition 
creates the DCPMs which exist in the Application Layer, as shown in Figure 3.1. This 
package also contains an OWL Model which details the logic required to communicate 
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with the privacy ontology through the API of the ontology. This logic includes the ability 
to translate each received message from the message format to the proper OWL request. 
The OWL Model contained in this package allows for the communication between a 
DCPM and the Domain Ontology in the application layer of the collaborative privacy 
architecture, as shown in Figure 3.1. 
During runtime of the collaborative environment, privacy related requests are received by 
the DCPMs. These requests are made by both regular collaborating users, and by Privacy 
Administrators. The instance of the domain ontology is updated whenever a request that 
results in a system change is received by a DCPM, such as an administrator adding a new 
user, creating a new project, or adding a new privacy rule. The CPM and its components 
have been designed and constructed using the Java programming language by Sun 
Microsystems [57], and implemented in the Eclipse integrated development environment 
(IDE) [74]. The CPM consists of client side components to allow it to send messages to a 
collaborating server, a GUI for user interaction and information output, components to 
allow it to connect to ontologies, and the message types it will interact with. Its current 
implementation consists of approximately 2000 lines of code in total. 
6.1.3 FIPPA 
The Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act began covering universities in 
Ontario on June 10, 2006 [83]. This act has two main governing principles: 
1. Records at public institutions in Ontario should be made available to the public 
2. The privacy of individuals should be protected 
To meet the first principle, the act outlines what records should be made available to the 
public, what exemptions exist on record collection, what the access procedures are for 
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accessing records, and how the disclosure of records to the public should take place. To 
address the second principle, FIPPA presents guidelines about the collection and 
retention of personal information, the proper use and disclosure of personal information, 
how personal information should be stored, and procedures for individuals to correct 
gathered personal information. It is in addressing the second principle that aspects of the 
act can be translated into the collaborative privacy architecture scenario. 
Section 2.1 of FIPPA states [22]: 
“personal information” means recorded information about an identifiable individual, 
including, 
a) information relating to the race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, 
sex, sexual orientation or marital or family status of the individual, 
b) information relating to the education or the medical, psychiatric, psychological, 
criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating to 
financial transactions in which the individual has been involved, 
c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual, 
d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual, 
e) the personal opinions or views of the individual except where they relate to 
another individual, 
f) correspondence sent to an institution by the individual that is implicitly or 
explicitly of a private or confidential nature, and replies to that correspondence 
that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence, 
g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual, and 
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h) the individual’s name where it appears with other personal information relating 
to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal 
information about the individual; (“renseignements personnels”) 
From this section of the act, types of information to be included in the privacy ontology 
can be gathered. These types of information are represented in the ontology by being 
added as sub-concepts to the information concept. Some sub-concepts can be clearly 
identified from this given list, such as age, sex, address and telephone number. Not all the 
identified concepts may be required if that type of information is not relevant to the 
domain of the collaborative environment. For example, race and religion of students may 
not be relevant to a research project at a university. Other listed types of information that 
could be included as sub-concepts in the domain ontology are not as clear, as some types 
of information given by the act are very broad. These broad types of information must be 
applied to the domain through the judgement of the PA. For example, sub-concepts can 
be gathered from the ideas of "employment history" (such as, a researcher's credentials), 
"identifying numbers" (such as, a student number), and "personal opinions of the 
individual" (such as, a student's research). 
6.1.4 PHIPA 
Hospitals present an extra challenge to privacy solutions as they are often covered under 
a separate set of rules regarding personal information. Such an example is used in this 
section to highlight the ability of the collaborative privacy framework to operate across 
different domains, and under different legislations. 
The Personal Health Information Protection Act is a piece of Ontario legislation that first 
took effect in 2004 [23]. PHIPA presents guidelines for hospitals in Ontario to follow 
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when collecting, using and disclosing personal information. This act specifically targets 
personal health information (PHI) rather than the more general personal information. 
Section 4 of PHIPA states: 
“personal health information”, subject to subsections (3) and (4), means identifying 
information about an individual in oral or recorded form, if the information, 
a) relates to the physical or mental health of the individual, including information 
that consists of the health history of the individual’s family, 
b) relates to the providing of health care to the individual, including the 
identification of a person as a provider of health care to the individual, 
c) is a plan of service within the meaning of the Home Care and Community 
Services Act, 1994 for the individual, 
d) relates to payments or eligibility for health care, or eligibility for coverage for 
health care, in respect of the individual, 
e) relates to the donation by the individual of any body part or bodily substance of 
the individual or is derived from the testing or examination of any such body part 
or bodily substance, 
f) is the individual’s health number, or 
g) identifies an individual’s substitute decision-maker. 
From this section of the act, types of information to be included in the domain ontology 
can be identified. This information would be included in the domain ontology as sub-
concept extension to the information concept. The types of information to be included 
depends on the requirements of the domain. When a hospital is collaborating to conduct 
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research using medical information, such information can include a patient's name, 
address, age, and information on a health condition [20]. 
PHI is often required to be anonymized before it may be used by those outside a patient's 
circle of care. Circle of care is a commonly used term to describe those health care 
custodians who are required to treat a patient within a hospital [11]. However, there are 
many situations where identifiable PHI is essential to research [20]. Identifiable PHI 
allows researchers to identify suitable participants to take part in clinical trials, it allows 
researchers to make the most use of research that has already been completed, it allows 
research on rare medical conditions where the sample size of patients is small, and it 
allows important research that requires long term follow-ups [20]. Because of this, many 
privacy legislations allow the collection, use and disclosure of PHI by heath care 
custodians for the purpose of conducting research [13]. For example, PHIPA in the 
province of Ontario permits the collection, use and disclosure of identifiable PHI by a 
patient's custodian to researchers [52][13]. This disclosure must follow a research plan 
and agreement between the custodian and the researcher, and is thoroughly described in 
Section 44 of PHIPA [23]. As a separate example, the Article 13(2) of the current 
European Data Protection Directive allows for the use of PHI which identifies patients 
"for purposes of scientific research or are kept in personal form for a period which does 
not exceed the period necessary for the sole purposes of creating statistics" [18]. 
The sharing of PHI as described by PHIPA for research purposes also states in Section 
44.3c [23] that: 
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whether, at the time the research is conducted, adequate safeguards will be in place to 
protect the privacy of the individuals whose personal health information is being 
disclosed and to preserve the confidentiality of the information; 
The collaborative privacy architecture presented in this thesis is one tool to provide 
safeguards when PHI is involved in collaborative work. Studies have found that patients 
are generally supportive of the idea of using their medical records for research, as long as 
it is made clear how and why those records will be used [73]. The collaborative privacy 
architecture presented in this thesis allows a health care custodian to state who is allowed 
to use the PHI, for what reasons and for how long. These rules will be able to adapt to the 
changing environment to ensure the wishes of private information owners are made clear 
as new collaborators enter and leave the project, or as the projects themselves change. 
6.1.5 Privacy Policies 
The privacy policies as outlined in Section 3 are a set of privacy rules, each of which 
contains four privacy elements. The privacy policies are represented within the domain 
ontology. The privacy policies and privacy rules can be created manually by a PA using 
Protégé or by directly editing the OWL files, or they can be created through messages to 
a DCPM which then interacts with the domain ontology through its API. In either case, 
the privacy rules are stored in the domain privacy ontology OWL file as instances of the 
ontology concepts PrivacyPolicy and PrivacyPolicyRule. A snapshot of a privacy rule 
displayed in the Protégé tool is shown in Figure 6.3. The privacy rule shown in Figure 6.3 
allows collection by a group, which is why the collectorIsOrg, collectorIsProject, and 
collectorIsNode relation fields are empty. The rule in Figure 6.3 is also not in conflict 
with any other rule, leaving its ruleConflict relation field empty. 
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Figure 6.3. Snapshot of a Privacy Rule in the Protégé Editor 
 
Each privacy rule is linked to a privacy policy through the hasRule relation within the 
privacy ontology. Each privacy policy is then associated to an individual collaborator 
through the hasNodePolicy relation within the privacy ontology. The associations 
through relations are shown in Figure 3.3. 
6.2 Implementation Scenarios 
In this section, scenarios that take place during the creation and execution of a CWE that 
is utilizing the collaborative privacy architecture are explained. These scenarios describe 
a situation, discuss how it is implemented, and show the execution results and 
measurements. 
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6.2.1 Scenario One - Collaborative Domain Creation 
The first scenario to be encountered in any environment is the initial creation of that 
environment according to its domain. The creation of the domain environment is handled 
by the DA and PA and must take place before any collaboration can occur. Following the 
privacy-by-design idea that privacy protection should not be added as an afterthought, the 
privacy architecture within this thesis is designed to allow for the protection of private 
information to be taken into account during the creation of the domain environment. The 
privacy architecture is utilized during domain creation by customizing the generic 
privacy ontology to include the required domain specific concepts. In this case, the 
concepts of Information, Purpose, OrgRole, and Node contained in the generic privacy 
ontology are extended to include domain custom sub-concepts, as shown in Figures 6.4 
and 6.5. 
 The Information concept is extended to include the types of information that are 
encountered in this domain. These outline each of the types of private information 
to be protected within the system. In this scenario the following private 
information types are created as sub-concepts: Address, Credentials, Date of Birth, 
Mark, Medical Record, Research Reports, Telephone Number, Sex, and Student 
Number. 
 The Purpose concept is extended to include reasons why information is collected 
in this particular domain. For our scenario, purpose is extended to include the sub-
concepts of: Communication, Directory, Grading, and Research. 
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 The organizational role (OrgRole) concept has been extended to include 
GraduateStudent and Researcher concepts. These roles assign Nodes to one or 
more groups within the university. 
 The Node concept in this scenario is specialized into the User and Custodian 
concepts, which represents the people performing work using the collaborative 
environment and the health care providers in charge of allowing access to medical 
information, respectively. 
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Figure 6.4. University and Hospital Example Domain Ontology Part 1 
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Figure 6.5. University and Hospital Example Domain Ontology Part 2 
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While only a few specializations of these concepts are shown in this scenario, each 
concept can be expanded further to fit larger or more complex domains and situations. 
The defined domain ontology is shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5. These two figures overlap 
in the concepts of Node, OrgRole, Group, Organization and Project; they represent a 
single domain ontology that has been divided into two figures for clarity. The privacy 
architecture requires the domain ontology to be expressed in a knowledge representation 
language, and in this scenario the Web Ontology Language (OWL) [68] is utilized for the 
reasons outlined in Section 6.1.1. The domain ontology exists at runtime in the 
Application Layer, and a copy can be saved in the ontology repository. This domain 
ontology is utilized by each DCPM in the performance of its roles. 
With the domain ontology created, the next step is the original creation of the instances. 
This scenario begins with the Organization University and the Participant Hospital. Four 
collaborating Nodes are created: GraduateStudent_A, GraduateStudent_B, Researcher_C 
and Custodian_D. These four users collaborate together within a research project, so an 
instance ResearchProject_1 is created. Each of these users are given a privacy policy, 
and the appropriate OrgRoles and ProjectRoles to assign them to the ResearchProject_1 
project and to their appropriate organizational groups. The final setup phase is the 
creation of privacy rules. Privacy rules that are created at domain creation time are based 
on the input of individual users if any, as well as guidelines and legislation. In our 
scenario, the legislation is based on the acts FIPPA and PHIPA. 
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According to Section 42.1.d of FIPPA, information may be disclosed: 
 where disclosure is made to an officer, employee, consultant or agent of the 
institution who needs the record in the performance of their duties and where 
disclosure is necessary and proper in the discharge of the institution’s functions; 
This regulation states that privacy rules should be created when they allow access to 
information required in the performance of an organizational task. In our example, the 
researcher in charge of a research project is required to perform the grading of the 
participating graduate students. In order to fulfill this requirement, the researcher must 
have access to the student numbers and marks of the students in their research project. 
Two project rules are made to meet this requirement, stating that any graduate student 
within a research project will allow the researcher with that same project access to their 
student number and mark. 
According to Section 42.1.b of FIPPA, information may be disclosed: 
 where the person to whom the information relates has identified that information 
in particular and consented to its disclosure; 
This rule states that an individual may allow access to their information as long as they 
have consented to that particular disclosure. In other words, this rule states that it is 
appropriate for individuals under the jurisdiction of FIPPA to create their own privacy 
rules. In our example, the researcher in charge of a research project wishes to share her 
telephone number with the members of the research project so they may reach her. 
Therefore, the researcher requests a privacy rule be added to her privacy policy that 
allows access to her phone number on a project-wide basis. 
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According to Section 44.1 of PHIPA, health information may be used for research 
purposes if the researcher: 
 submits to the custodian, 
o an application in writing, 
o a research plan that meets the requirements of subsection, and 
o a copy of the decision of a research ethics board that approves the 
research plan; and 
 enters into the agreement 
According to this rule, health information may be used for research purposes if an 
appropriate research plan has been approved. In our example, this research plan would be 
created between the university and hospital before the collaboration began. Research 
plans require safeguards be put in place to protect the private information, and the 
collaborative privacy architecture functions as one such safeguard. With a research plan 
in place, privacy rules can be created which allow access to the health information to the 
appropriate individuals. This process demonstrates how privacy rules can be created to 
address outside guidelines or legislations, and the created privacy rules are shown in 
Figure 6.6. 
106 
 
 
 
 
PrivacyPolicyA(GraduateStudent_A) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(Mark), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule2:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(StudentNo), 
        Retention(365)} 
PrivacyPolicyB(GraduateStudent_B) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(Mark), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule2:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(StudentNo), 
        Retention(365)} 
PrivacyPolicyC(Researcher_C) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Communication), 
        Collector(ResearchProject_1), 
        Information(PhoneNo), 
        Retention(365)} 
PrivacyPolicyD(Custodian_D) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Research), 
        Collector(ResearchProject_1), 
        Information(PatientAge), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule2:{Purpose(Communication), 
        Collector(ResearchProject_1), 
        Information(BloodWork), 
        Retention(365)} 
Figure 6.6. Privacy Policy Examples from the University and Hospital Scenario 
Upon the creation of the privacy policies for these four users, the reasoning layer would 
determine who has access to what information, according to what privacy rules. This is 
done through the execution of semantic rules. In our implementation, these rules are 
written in the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) [28]. A SWRL rule is executed to 
check for rules whose collector is determined by the organization, group, project or 
individual. 
Node(?node_provider) ∧ 
hasNodePolicy(?node_provider, ?node_provider_policy) ∧ 
hasRule(?node_provider_policy, ?node_provider_rule) ∧ 
collectorIsProject(?node_provider_rule, ?project_1) ∧ 
Node(?node_collector) ∧ 
hasNodeProjectRole(?node_collector, ?node_collector_role) ∧ 
belongsToProject(?node_collector_role, ?project_1) ∧ 
differentFrom(?node_provider, ?node_collector) → 
allowedBy(?node_collector, ?node_provider_rule) 
Figure 6.7. SWRL Rule Determining Access via Privacy Rule, According to Project 
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In our implementation, the rule engine Jess [67] is used to execute the semantic rules. 
Jess was selected due to its compatibility with the Java platform, which the CPM is 
created in. The rule shown in Figure 6.7 acts on any privacy rule that allows collection by 
projects. The resulting inference by the rule engine adds the axioms shown in Figure 6.8 
to the domain ontology. 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_A, PrivacyPolicyRule_C1) 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_A, PrivacyPolicyRule_D1) 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_A, PrivacyPolicyRule_D2) 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_B, PrivacyPolicyRule_C1) 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_B, PrivacyPolicyRule_D1) 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_B, PrivacyPolicyRule_D2) 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_C1) 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_D1) 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_D2) 
allowedBy(Custodian_D, PrivacyPolicyRule_C1) 
allowedBy(Custodian _D, PrivacyPolicyRule_D1) 
allowedBy(Custodian _D, PrivacyPolicyRule_D2) 
Figure 6.8. Results from Project Level Access SWRL Rule 
These inferred axioms link each member of the project to the rules that permit access to 
information shared to the entire project. The privacy rules shown in Figure 6.6 also 
contain rules that allow for collection by a single individual. The rule shown in Figure 6.9 
acts on any privacy rule that allows collection by an individual. 
Node(?node_provider) ∧ 
hasNodePolicy(?node_provider, ?node_provider_policy) ∧ 
hasRule(?node_provider_policy, ?node_provider_rule) ∧ 
Node(?node_collector) ∧ 
collectorIsNode(?node_provider_rule, ?node_collector) → 
allowedBy(?node_collector, ?node_provider_rule) 
 
Figure 6.9. SWRL Rule Determining Access via Privacy Rule, According to Node 
When the rule shown in Figure 6.9 is executed by the rule engine, the resulting inference 
adds the axioms shown in Figure 6.10 to the domain ontology. 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_A1) 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_A2) 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_B1) 
allowedBy(Researcher_C, PrivacyPolicyRule_B2) 
Figure 6.10. Results from Node Level Access SWRL Rule 
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These inferred axioms link the researcher in the research project to the rules that permit 
access to the appropriate graduate student information. 
6.2.2 Scenario Two - Requesting Private Information 
Users are able to interact through the domain collaboration application within the 
Application Layer of the architecture. Messages related to privacy sent by a user are 
received by a DCPM, which decides the correct response for any message requests it 
receives with assistance from the knowledge within the domain ontology. As 
collaborative environments are built in order to allow for information sharing and 
collaborative work, a large number of messages that are sent during regular collaboration 
are requests for information. When a request for access to private information is received, 
the DCPM carries out a set of decisions to determine if the request can be accepted [4]. In 
this scenario, GraduateStudent_A requests access to the telephone number of 
Researcher_C. An information request message includes the requestor's name, the target's 
name, the information being requested, a reason why the information is needed (purpose), 
and a length of time for the information use (retention). This message is captured by a 
DCPM and processed. The processes the DCPM performs when checking an information 
request message are shown in Figure 6.11, displayed using the ArchiMate® 2.0 open 
standard [75]. 
The business event in Figure 6.11 is the information request which triggers the DCPM 
process. A business event is something that occurs externally which influences business 
processes, functions, or interactions [75]. The privacy domain ontology is included in 
Figure 6.11 as a business object, which is a passive entity that is manipulated by the 
109 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11. Information Request Business Process Diagram 
 
business process [75]. The DCPM first determines what information is being requested 
and who the requestor is. In this scenario, GraduateStudent_A requests access to the 
Researcher_C's telephone number. This request is made through the domain collaboration 
application used by the university. In the second process, the DCPM determines if the 
requestor has the allowance to view the private information in question (such as the 
results shown in Figure 6.8), through the knowledge contained in the domain ontology. 
Because access is granted in this architecture via a privacy rule, and not via direct access 
to the information, the DCPM is required to make a second check. It is in this second 
checking process that the conditions contained in the information request message (the 
purpose for the information gathering and the retention period) are compared to the 
privacy rule in question. A decision is returned based on these comparisons, and the 
results of this comparison are stored by the DCPM. This storage provides a record of 
requests and the agreed upon terms of use. This record allows for clarification if someone 
is later unsure of how information they have gathered can be used, as well as provides 
evidence if a dispute in the agreement ever occurs. Finally, the DCPM notifies requestor 
GraduateStudent_A of the results of her information request. A successful request 
permits access to the information in question. 
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6.2.3 Scenario Three - Addition of New Privacy Rule 
It is possible during runtime of the collaborative environment, for a user to make changes 
to his or her own privacy policy. This can allow access to information that was not 
originally considered during the domain setup, which often occurs as projects progress 
and situations change. In order to make a change to their privacy policy, a user makes a 
request to provide access to information through the domain collaboration application. 
This request is sent to a PA who is tasked with creating the formal individual privacy rule. 
The request is initially sent to the PA in order to confirm the request by the user is 
allowed, and to alleviate the burden of creating the rule in its proper format from the user. 
The PA sends the formal rule to a DCPM in the Application Layer. The ability to allow 
an individual user to add to their privacy policy creates fine-grained control, as the user 
can tailor their privacy policy to their specific needs [4]. 
For a rule creation request, the DCPM uses the parameters contained in the message to 
create privacy rules in a machine readable format, in this case OWL. Figure 6.12 shows 
the business process view of adding a new privacy rule. 
 
Figure 6.12. Add Privacy Rule Request Business Process Diagram 
 
Continuing with the given research scenario, GraduateStudent_A wishes to add to her 
privacy policy. In this case, GraduateStudent_A wishes to share her current research with 
GraduateStudent_B for his input. As stated in Section 6.1.1, the research of a student is 
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considered private in this domain, and as such privacy permission must be given by 
GraduateStudent_A. As GraduateStudent_A is a regular collaborator who may not have 
the expertise to create the privacy rule request, a message is sent to their PA with the rule 
she would like added to her privacy policy. The PA creates the formal request which is 
handled by a DCPM at the Application Layer on the collaboration server. Each message 
sent to a DCPM contains an ID, allowing the DCPM to determine how it should respond 
to each request. In Figure 6.12, the Add Privacy Rule Request is shown as a business 
event. Within the execution process of the DCPM, several processes take place. The first 
process determines what rule should be created. This is performed by retrieving the 
privacy rule to be created from within the message itself. This privacy rule information is 
stored within the message as a privacy rule type, a unique class that is understood by both 
the client and server. However, this class is not in a format that can be directly applied to 
the privacy ontology. Therefore, the second process converts the request into a format 
understood by the domain ontology, which is send sent to the domain ontology for 
execution. The result is the addition of Rule3 to PrivacyPolicyA as shown in Figure 6.13. 
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PrivacyPolicyA(GraduateStudent_A) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(Mark), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule2:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(StudentNo), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule3:{Purpose(Research), 
        Collector(GraduateStudent_B), 
        Information(A_ResearchResults), 
        Retention(365)} 
PrivacyPolicyB(GraduateStudent_B) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(Mark), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule2:{Purpose(Grading), 
        Collector(Researcher_C), 
        Information(StudentNo), 
        Retention(365)} 
PrivacyPolicyC(Researcher_C) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Communication), 
        Collector(ResearchProject_1), 
        Information(PhoneNo), 
        Retention(365)} 
PrivacyPolicyD(Custodian_D) 
    Rule1:{Purpose(Research), 
        Collector(ResearchProject_1), 
        Information(PatientAge), 
        Retention(365)} 
    Rule2:{Purpose(Communication), 
        Collector(ResearchProject_1), 
        Information(BloodWork), 
        Retention(365)} 
Figure 6.13. Updated Privacy Policy Examples from the University and Hospital Scenario 
The addition of a privacy rule is registered as a system change. Therefore, the reasoning 
engine infers new knowledge based on this request, and returns this information to the 
CPM. In this case, the knowledge that is inferred is who now has access to information 
based on the new privacy rule. The SWRL rule shown in Figure 6.9 would perform this 
inference, with the results shown in Figure 6.14. 
allowedBy(GraduateStudent_B, PrivacyPolicyRule_A3) 
Figure 6.14. Updated Results from Node Level Access SWRL Rule 
 
These results are important to the users who have gained allowance, as well as to the user 
who is providing the information. Therefore, messages are sent by a DCPM informing 
the involved parties of the changes that have been made. 
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6.2.4 Scenario Four - Removal of Privacy Rule 
Upon entering the collaborative system, each collaborating user is assigned a privacy 
policy by a DCPM. These policies are dependent on what organization, group and project 
the new user belongs to. It is possible that some of the assigned rules do not agree with an 
individual's privacy requirements, or that a rule previously added by the individual is no 
longer required. When faced with this situation, a collaborator may have a privacy rule 
removed from their privacy policy if the rule in question is not required by the domain. 
For example, the rules shown in Figure 6.13 which allow Researcher_C to access 
GraduateStudent_A's mark and student number are required for the researcher to perform 
her duties. As a result, a request by GraduateStudent_A to remove these rules would be 
denied. Another possibility is rules can be removed as the situation changes. If the 
collaboration between GraduateStudent_A and GraduateStudent_B is no longer required, 
the rule allowing access to GraduateStudent_A's research as shown in Figure 6.13 may be 
removed. The user is able to make a privacy rule deletion request which is sent to a PA. If 
accepted, the formal removal request is sent to an active DCPM. Privacy policies are 
stored by the DCPMs at the Application Layer in a machine readable format. In our case, 
OWL is used to record the privacy policies. For a rule deletion request, the CPM searches 
the OWL file for the requested rule and removes it. Figure 6.15 shows the rule in OWL 
format allowing GraduateStudent_B to access GraduateStudent_A's research. Upon 
receiving a removal request, this rule is deleted. The removal of a privacy rule is a system 
change, and would trigger an updating of the domain ontology. The Jess reasoning engine 
would once again be run according to the SWRL semantic rules, and the current set of 
allowedBy conditions would be replaced by the new resulting inference. 
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  <PrivacyPolicyRule rdf:about="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1351695753.owl#GraduateStudent_A_Rule3"> 
    <collectorIsNode rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1351695753.owl#GraduateStudent_B"/> 
    <ruleHasRetention> 
      <Retention rdf:about="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1351695753.owl#365"/> 
    </ruleHasRetention> 
    <ruleProtectsInfo rdf:resource="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1351695753.owl#A_ResearchResults"/> 
    <ruleHasPurpose> 
      <Directory rdf:about="http://www.owl-
ontologies.com/Ontology1351695753.owl#A_B_Research"> 
    </ruleHasPurpose> 
  </PrivacyPolicyRule> 
Figure 6.15. OWL Rule Allowing Access to Research of GraduateStudent_A 
6.3 Experimental Evaluation 
In this section, the ability of the reasoning engine to infer information from the privacy 
ontology is tested. As explained in Section 3.5, the process to infer information occurs in 
three steps. 
1. The transfer of the ontology knowledge (ontological concepts, relations and 
instances) and the semantic rules to the reasoning engine. 
2. The inference of new knowledge in the form of axioms. 
3. The transfer of the inferred knowledge back to the domain ontology. 
Each experiment involved these three steps, and for each the time the rule engine took to 
deliver its results was recorded. During step 1, the number of axioms transferred from the 
ontology to the rule engine was measured. For step 2, the number of axioms inferred by 
the reasoning engine was measured. This same number of axioms was then exported to 
the OWL Model in step 3. From these measurements, a comparison was done to examine 
how the rule engine performs as the situation becomes more complicated and more 
axioms are involved in the calculations. Each experiment was carried out a total of one 
hundred times on a single platform under identical conditions. From this set of samples, a 
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mean of the sample time was calculated, along with the standard deviation and a 
confidence interval according to a confidence coefficient of 95%. As each test run was 
identical, the number of axioms involved in steps 1, 2 and 3 were also identical, so no 
average axiom calculation was required. 
The experimental platform consisted of a single machine with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-
4700MQ 2.40GHz CPU and 16.0GB RAM. All of the experiments were tested on a 
Windows 8.1 64-bit platform, using the rule engine Jess [67]. The ontology definitions 
were stored in OWL [8] format. 
6.3.1 Increasing Number of Users 
In order to test the scalability of the collaborative privacy architecture, the addition of a 
privacy rule was introduced into a system with an increasing number of users who would 
be impacted by the new rule. A rule was created to allow everyone within the same 
organization access to a piece of information, while increasing the total users in the 
organization. 
As discussed in Section 3.5, the first step is the transfer of the ontology and rules to the 
rule engine. The results of this transfer with an increasing amount of users are shown in 
Figure 6.16. The detailed results along with the entire sample set and calculated 
confidence values are found in Appendix B1. The results show the number of axioms 
involved in each result. As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, axioms are first-order logic rules 
that are used to place constraints on the use of concept instances and they model 
statements that are true. 
The graph in Figure 6.16 shows the average execution time as an unmarked line with a 
confidence interval marked above and below this line as horizontal dashes. The number 
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of axioms exported to the rule engine are marked on the other line with circles. As the 
number of users increases in the system, the number of axioms contained in the ontology 
that must be exported also increases. The time required to export this information showed 
some variation on low number of users, then began to show a gradual climb as the 
number of users increased by large amounts. The results for the case of 10 users showed 
results slightly higher than is expected based on the later sample mean times. This higher 
result for a low number of users is most likely due to problems with the multithreading of 
the processor the tests were conducted on. However the confidence interval shows that it 
is possible for the increase to be a continual climb. The shallowness of the climbing 
timing results and slow increase rate shows that the rule engine is able to handle the 
dramatic increase of users without substantially increasing its time to execute. 
 
Figure 6.16. Time to Export vs. Total Users 
 
The second step is the execution of the rule engine and the inference of new knowledge. 
The results of this execution with an increasing amount of users are shown in Figure 6.17. 
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The detailed results along with the entire sample set and calculated confidence values are 
found in Appendix B2. 
 
Figure 6.17. Time to Execute Rule Engine vs. Total Users 
 
The graph in Figure 6.17 shows the average execution time on the line unmarked with 
confidence intervals drawn as horizontal dashes. The number of axioms inferred is shown 
by the line marked with circles. As the number of users increased in the system, the 
number of axioms inferred by the system also increases as more users were given access 
according to the new rule. The timing results in this text showed the rule engine was able 
to handle a rule that impacted a large amount of users with only a slight increase in 
execution time (roughly 200ms). This again demonstrates the scalability of the rule 
engine inference, as it can tolerate an increase in the number of users within the system. 
The final recorded time is the transfer of the inferred knowledge to the domain ontology. 
The newly discovered ontological information is sent to the domain model and stored in 
the format of the model, in this case OWL. Figure 6.18 shows the results of transferring 
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the inferred axioms back to the OWL model. The detailed results along with the entire 
sample set and calculated confidence values are found in Appendix B3. 
 
Figure 6.18. Time to Transfer Inferred Axioms to OWL Model, Users 
The outputting of the file shows promising results as well. As the number of users in the 
project increased, so too did the number of inferred axioms that had to be exported to the 
OWL model. However, the time required to transfer the results from the rule engine back 
to the ontology only showed a very slight increase (approximately 50ms). The results also 
appeared to plateau as the number of axioms to export increased. These results also 
highlight the ability of the ontology to scale as required. 
6.3.2 Concurrent Projects 
Another set of tests was performed to observe the ability to infer knowledge when there 
are different rules impacting different sets of users at the same time. In this test, a number 
of separate projects were created in the collaborative environment, with 50 users assigned 
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to each project. A privacy rule was created for each project that stated users within a 
project should be able to access a piece of information from every other user in the 
project. In this case, the information in question was the research results of each 
individual. As mentioned in Section 6.3.1, such information can be considered private. 
This experiment was designed to see how the system handles an ontology containing an 
increasing number of privacy policies being checked simultaneously. 
Once again, the first step of the inference process is the transfer of the ontology and rules 
to the rule engine. The results of this transfer with an increasing amount of projects being 
used is shown in Figure 6.19. The detailed results along with the entire sample set and 
calculated confidence values are found in Appendix B4. 
 
Figure 6.19. Time to Export vs. Total Projects 
 
The graph in Figure 6.19 shows the average execution time by the unmarked line, with 
the confidence intervals drawn above and below this line as horizontal dashes. The 
number of axioms exported to the rule engine is shown on the line marked with circles. 
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The export process in this case did not show any dramatic increase as more projects were 
included in the organization. The trend is a slow gradual climb, showing tolerance to the 
increase in projects. The results with 3 projects were slightly higher than the trend would 
predict, but the expected result is within the 95% confidence interval. 
The results of the second step where the rule engine is executed are shown in Figure 6.20. 
The detailed results along with the entire sample set and calculated confidence values are 
found in Appendix B5. 
 
Figure 6.20. Time to Execute Rule Engine vs. Total Projects 
 
The graph in Figure 6.20 shows the average execution on the unmarked line with 
confidence intervals drawn above and below this line as horizontal dashes. The number 
of axioms inferred is shown by the line marked with circles. As the number of projects 
with policies increased in the system, so too did the number of axioms inferred by the 
rule engine. The processing time did trend upward in this case, however the trend was 
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small (approximately 400ms). This result again shows the ability of the rule engine to 
carry out its tasks without falling victim to an exponential or other large increase in 
execution time. 
Once again the final recorded time is the transfer of the inferred knowledge to the domain 
ontology OWL model. Figure 6.21 shows the results of transferring the inferred axioms 
back to the OWL model. The detailed results along with the entire sample set and 
calculated confidence values are found in Appendix B6. 
 
Figure 6.21. Time to Transfer Inferred Axioms to OWL Model, Projects 
 
The transfer of the inferred axioms back to ontological knowledge in this case shows an 
upward trend. However, as with the other results, it is a shallow trend and not a dramatic 
quadratic or exponential increase. The situation of multiple projects requiring an update 
at once generally occurs at the beginning of operation, when many projects are initialized 
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at once. However once the collaborative environment is active and running, changes to 
projects tend to occur one at a time as different projects update at different times. 
6.4 Summary 
In this chapter the implementation of the Collaborative Privacy Architecture was 
presented, including the privacy ontology, Collaborative Privacy Manager, and the 
utilized privacy policies. A case study involving different organizations who wish to 
collaborate while following privacy regulations was presented. This scenario was 
illustrated through several situations that demonstrate how the privacy architecture 
operates when faced with different problems of providing privacy. Measurements were 
shown to demonstrate how the system performs under different scaling situations. The 
recorded measurements showed promise in the system's ability to perform under different 
user loads. Some variance was detected due to the environment the tests were run on 
along with the execution process of the engine Jess. The shallow increases shown in the 
results show that the increase in execution time created by larger environment sizes can 
be managed through the use of extra hardware when the need arises. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions and Future Work 
This final chapter presents conclusions of the thesis and a review of the work that has 
been completed. Following this, ideas and directions for future work are described. These 
ideas and directions are provided in order to provide the basis for future research areas 
that can expand and improve upon the work done this thesis. 
7.1 Conclusions 
This thesis confronted the challenges of providing privacy in a collaborative working 
environments. As CWEs continue to grow in popularity and ability, the need to provide 
privacy protection becomes paramount. Collaborators must be ensured that they are not 
sacrificing the protection and control of their private information in order to take 
advantage of the abilities of a CWE. When a large number of people are permitted to 
exchange great amounts of information without properly defined privacy, the ability to 
indicate how that information should be handled and used can quickly be lost. 
Collaborative environments have the ability to change the number of collaborators, and 
the roles, groups and projects within the environment, making this issue of determining 
how information should be handled even more complicated. This dynamic property of 
collaborative environments also requires that any privacy protection put in place must be 
able to handle changes at runtime and be able to adapt to the environment. 
In order to address these many problems, a generic, semantic-driven architecture for 
providing privacy protection in collaborative environments is proposed. The architecture 
proposed in this thesis is able to operate in dynamic, many-to-many environments while 
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being compatible with different privacy guidelines or legislations that may be required by 
the domain. This architecture was designed to address the idea of adaptability, allowing it 
to meet the requirements of different collaborative domains. To meet this requirement, 
the architecture provides the ability to collaborate through implicit sessions in distributed 
environments, while also being able to infer through semantics who has access to what 
information, and according to what privacy conditions. These semantic inferences can be 
completed because the architecture utilizes a domain independent ontologies containing 
concepts of privacy and collaboration. The generic privacy ontology contains concepts 
that can be extended and customized to meet any specific domain requirements. The 
privacy ontology also provide collaborating users with access, modification rights, and 
transparency to their privacy information. The privacy ontology is able to infer who has 
access to what information in the environment, according to which privacy rules. This 
allows a user to know at any time who has access to their information and under what 
circumstances they are able to use that information, as well as the ability to change these 
conditions. In order to satisfy privacy requirements, after determining someone has the 
proper rights to access a piece of information, a secondary check is performed to 
determine if the reasons for the collection of private information is approved by the 
information owner. 
This thesis utilizes its own privacy policy to allow collaborating users to properly convey 
how they will allow the use of their private information. This thesis presents this privacy 
policy, along with the privacy rules it contains and how these privacy rules are defined. 
The privacy policy is defined within the concepts and relationships of the privacy 
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ontology, which allows for the policy to be technically enforceable while still being 
customizable. 
An additional contribution of this thesis is the introduction of a Collaborative Privacy 
Manager (CPM) as a service to help with the protection of privacy within collaborative 
work environments. The architecture of the CPM is presented in this thesis, 
demonstrating the internal levels and modules required to produce the desired results. 
Each module was introduced, with their functions, tasks and interactions with each other 
defined. The CPM operates as a service, and the collaborative privacy architecture was 
designed to allow for service interaction. This not only provides the ability to use the 
CPM, but other services that may be required by a domain as well. Together the privacy 
architecture and CPM create a privacy solution that allows for easy handling and 
understanding of private information and the protective rules surrounding that 
information. 
In this thesis a scenario was used to demonstrate the various aspects of the privacy 
architecture. This scenario involved a university and hospital who collaborated together 
in order to conduct research. Each organization was required to base their privacy rules 
on different pieces of privacy legislation. Through this scenario, the process of setting up 
a collaborative environment with the privacy architecture and the reasons for doing so 
was outlined. How the architecture performed when executing semantic rules and 
determining privacy allowances was shown. Measurements were taken of the architecture 
operating in varying stressful environments, to demonstrate its ability to handle changes 
and produce correct results. 
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7.2 Future Work 
Privacy is a vast area of research, and the work presented in this thesis covers just one 
aspect of it. This thesis took a privacy-by-policy approach to privacy within collaborative 
environments. One important expansion on this work that can be conducted is creating a 
solution for privacy in collaborative environments through a privacy-by-architecture 
approach. Privacy-by-architecture handles traditional security approaches to protecting 
privacy. A privacy-by-architecture solution would include topics including providing 
network privacy and providing the optimal encryption of messages and information. 
Research into privacy-by-architecture for collaborative environments would complement 
the work presented in this thesis, and together the two works would make each other 
stronger. 
As privacy is closely related to security, there are additional security mechanisms that the 
work in this thesis would benefit from. The addition of context control mechanisms 
would strengthen the privacy provided by this architecture. These mechanisms would 
learn and adapt to the dynamic changes of a collaborative environment and help users 
make suitable dynamic decisions. A collaborative management system would be able to 
make the collaboration presented in this thesis more efficient. An authorization system 
would be beneficial and allow the collaborative environment to be properly confident in 
the identity of each collaborating user. As well, a proper auditing solution would work 
very well with the privacy architecture presented in this thesis. An auditing system would 
ensure that the policies and agreements reached between collaborating users are 
maintained through the proper tracking of message requests and information usages. 
Privacy solutions in any domain often work closely together with other security systems. 
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Together the systems listed here could work with the presented privacy architecture to 
provide comprehensive solution for allowing secure collaborative work. 
The functions of the CPM can be expanded in order to further enhance the privacy 
provided by the service within the collaborative privacy architecture. One expansion is 
into the ability to provide user privacy policy suggestions. This ability would assist 
greatly in making the privacy solution easier for users to understand and work with. The 
ability to provide appropriate suggestions requires algorithms to be developed that can 
optimally search and parse the existing privacy policies, according to a given input. 
When completed, this ability can present the user with privacy rules that are pre-
completed in order to reduce the workload of the user. The user would not be required to 
implement these suggested rules, but could be presented with a reason why the system 
believes they should be implemented. This function would require significant research 
into developing the proper algorithms and an investigation into the most common types 
of privacy rules that are created in different collaborative domains. 
Another area of future research that can build off this work is an investigation into how 
the merging of ontologies can be incorporated into our architecture. The merging of 
ontologies is an entire research domain on its own, and would provide an interesting track 
for expansion. There are many approaches to merging ontologies, including manually, 
semi-automatically and automatically, with each approach having different tools for the 
task. The ability to merge our ontology with others would allow organizations who 
incorporate their own ontologies to more easily use our architecture. 
Monitoring for abnormal conditions is another area identified that the CPM would benefit 
from. This process would be different from the Conflict Engine, which was previously 
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described in Section 3.2.3. The Conflict Engine detects possible errors between privacy 
rules on a single user's privacy policy, with no regard to the actions of other users. The 
abnormal condition monitoring ability of the CPM would differ in that it would search for 
possible errors or attacks coming from other users. Research into this topic would be 
beneficial to discover what abnormal conditions should be monitored for. This research 
would require large amounts of data to be gathered from real-world collaborative 
environments, surrounding what types of requests are made, what requests often fail, and 
what other significant events take place. With this research gathered, a monitoring 
solution could be implemented that would allow the CPM to properly diagnose when a 
problem is occurring within the environment. Similarly, research into not only what 
constitutes a significant event, but when these events become significant can be 
conducted. This would allow the CPM to properly set thresholds to indicate when events 
occurring within the environment have become a problem or when they need further 
attention. 
The sanitization of private information ability requires additional research to be 
completed. How to properly anonymize and randomize information is its own field of 
research with different approaches and opinions into what is the best way it can be 
performed. Research to discover the best way it can be implemented within this 
architecture would provide an additional tool for protecting the privacy of collaborative 
users. Optimally, such a solution would create a standard input and output compatible 
with the rest of this privacy architecture. This would create a modular solution that allows 
for different approaches towards anonymization to be taken. A modular approach would 
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better fit with the domain independence goal of this privacy architecture, and allow 
different domains to treat the issue as they see fit. 
Another area of expansion for this work would be an investigation into the addition of 
negation for privacy rules. Currently, this work handles negation through the absence of a 
rule, not through the creation of a specific rule outlining a negation. How this can be 
addressed or met would further expand the work. One limitation of any rule system is that 
we cannot fully automate all human reasoning. It is not possible to express everything 
stated in natural language in first-order logic, as is done in this work. What can be done 
to overcome or mitigate this limitation would provide excellent research for future work 
as well. 
Another area of future work is the deployment of the described collaborative privacy 
architecture in a larger commercial or research setting. The development and testing 
presented in this thesis, while based on real world scenarios and legislations, was 
confined to a laboratory setting. Research on larger equipment would be better able to 
stress test the abilities and functions of the architecture. How the expansion of concepts 
to meet organizational demands could be observed, with adjustments to the architecture 
made to address any discovered problems. Additionally, this would allow the deployment 
of the CPM service in a better test environment in order to more accurately measure its 
performance and functionality. From these measurements, any additional abilities that the 
CPM should include could be investigated. Finally, integration of the architecture and 
CPM into a real-world domain collaboration application would provide significant testing 
opportunities. In this thesis, the domain collaboration application was basic and created to 
allow for testing of input and output from collaboration. The use of an application, either 
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research or industrial, which is used by others on a larger scale would be a significant 
research opportunity. With a fully functional domain collaboration application operating 
as a front end interface for user collaboration, and with many more collaborating users 
operating independently from the architecture, more accurate measurements and results 
can be gathered. 
In conclusion, the collaborative privacy architecture and the accompanying CPM 
proposed in this thesis are considered to be important steps forward in the protection of 
private information within collaborative working environments. This architecture 
provides for greater understanding and management of collaborating users privacy 
preferences while being independent of the domain involved. This architecture allows for 
the tracking and monitoring of privacy preferences and information in real-time, during 
dynamic changes to the domain environment. 
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Appendix A 
OECD Member Countries 
Below is a list of all the OECD member countries, presented in the order in which they deposited 
their instruments of ratification of the Convention on the OECD [37]. 
1 Canada April 10, 1961 
2 United States April 12, 1961 
3 United Kingdom May 2, 1961 
4 Denmark May 30, 1961 
5 Iceland June 5, 1961 
6 Norway July 4, 1961 
7 Turkey August 2, 1961 
8 Spain August 3, 1961 
9 Portugal August 4, 1961 
10 France August 7, 1961 
11 Ireland August 17, 1961 
12 Belgium September 13, 1961 
13 Germany September 27, 1961 
14 Greece September 27, 1961 
15 Sweden September 28, 1961 
16 Switzerland September 28, 1961 
17 Austria September 29, 1961 
18 Netherlands November 13, 1961 
19 Luxembourg December 7, 1961 
20 Italy March 29, 1962 
21 Japan April 28, 1964 
22 Finland January 28, 1969 
23 Australia June 7, 1971 
24 New Zealand May 29, 1973 
OECD Privacy Guidelines Adopted September 23, 1980 
25 Mexico May 18, 1994 
26 Czech Republic December 21, 1995 
27 Hungary May 7, 1996 
28 Poland November 22, 1996 
29 Korea December 12, 1996 
30 Slovak Republic December 14, 2000 
31 Chile May 7, 2010 
32 Slovenia July 21, 2010 
33 Israel September 7, 2010 
34 Estonia December 9, 2010 
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Appendix B 
Testing Results 
In this appendix all the results that were gathered to create the graphs shown in Section 6 are 
shown. 
Appendix B1 
Axiom Export Timing Results – Users 
Users 10 50 100 200 500 1000 
Axioms 
Exported to 
Rule Engine 
18183 18383 18633 19133 20633 23133 
Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard 
Deviation 
252.20 257.58 275.78 256.53 294.89 364.93 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Level of 
Significance 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Margin of 
Error 
49.43 50.48 54.05 50.28 57.80 71.52 
Confidence 
Interval Max 
847.90 816.50 827.32 834.76 888.00 1076.59 
Sample Time 
Mean 
798.47 766.02 773.27 784.48 830.20 1005.07 
Confidence 
Interval Min 
749.04 715.54 719.22 734.20 772.40 933.55 
Run Results 688 
744 
734 
729 
497 
541 
594 
710 
494 
994 
502 
484 
480 
1083 
922 
697 
635 
734 
984 
607 
1194 
547 
525 
617 
521 
1315 
860 
897 
617 
507 
898 
748 
607 
579 
897 
1153 
559 
595 
541 
814 
1643 
1399 
1430 
522 
1340 
602 
1061 
728 
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713 
491 
1003 
969 
524 
895 
771 
491 
882 
1054 
851 
1164 
824 
1052 
766 
484 
525 
790 
727 
585 
654 
492 
972 
735 
787 
493 
547 
550 
744 
610 
616 
1058 
444 
1000 
651 
687 
632 
891 
679 
1480 
851 
594 
1029 
1205 
712 
569 
729 
603 
585 
1385 
1139 
896 
575 
908 
462 
507 
587 
484 
808 
484 
850 
929 
977 
734 
444 
506 
598 
885 
751 
1074 
996 
867 
578 
493 
721 
615 
1155 
648 
462 
672 
453 
1033 
664 
632 
453 
1242 
466 
930 
875 
1251 
773 
1419 
863 
554 
719 
487 
1112 
1236 
1077 
547 
764 
906 
1201 
710 
1365 
726 
570 
1081 
609 
821 
884 
494 
516 
467 
507 
827 
584 
695 
956 
631 
601 
657 
504 
1193 
944 
844 
554 
492 
999 
852 
516 
591 
647 
1273 
563 
492 
494 
698 
624 
893 
956 
454 
1032 
1773 
1358 
807 
565 
510 
555 
609 
803 
695 
1084 
554 
541 
790 
1052 
1218 
896 
923 
531 
508 
507 
1297 
509 
1236 
964 
479 
878 
1296 
1314 
1203 
515 
570 
516 
913 
523 
594 
1433 
843 
1225 
560 
571 
710 
794 
610 
648 
703 
539 
1281 
462 
771 
908 
1215 
859 
657 
532 
861 
1235 
822 
554 
768 
601 
615 
540 
1529 
703 
983 
820 
548 
578 
492 
646 
617 
600 
1204 
993 
1046 
531 
556 
1535 
744 
834 
1321 
1391 
507 
1400 
1309 
625 
750 
805 
741 
538 
516 
793 
1217 
637 
516 
494 
524 
484 
602 
704 
505 
664 
1311 
758 
1342 
609 
522 
742 
911 
685 
976 
585 
1110 
767 
1347 
1481 
640 
588 
1566 
537 
789 
734 
552 
934 
1298 
1107 
588 
799 
1925 
983 
523 
1293 
1468 
985 
867 
1500 
1460 
555 
824 
711 
859 
680 
816 
906 
1325 
593 
556 
541 
932 
1404 
1262 
555 
874 
1032 
569 
1193 
609 
1204 
892 
1345 
1250 
609 
679 
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767 
602 
656 
1179 
584 
1382 
610 
756 
868 
635 
569 
1122 
535 
649 
1438 
562 
1046 
1147 
1453 
790 
604 
524 
1333 
869 
1202 
689 
697 
616 
695 
1032 
703 
1094 
1158 
884 
618 
615 
1156 
659 
666 
1011 
751 
544 
772 
1062 
560 
1241 
547 
867 
618 
649 
790 
578 
984 
716 
532 
1354 
1124 
554 
696 
1133 
1121 
1194 
669 
1062 
491 
508 
766 
993 
735 
625 
492 
475 
476 
578 
572 
485 
609 
480 
666 
1181 
1147 
1178 
1355 
800 
866 
616 
1391 
599 
781 
672 
1390 
1227 
1024 
477 
682 
681 
656 
1100 
804 
496 
491 
490 
581 
960 
801 
812 
578 
647 
789 
645 
582 
531 
572 
433 
665 
713 
524 
1321 
459 
1218 
787 
1142 
850 
586 
745 
1159 
485 
694 
594 
696 
830 
1020 
578 
586 
474 
635 
789 
663 
955 
712 
516 
674 
1061 
895 
578 
587 
571 
695 
789 
716 
1125 
1179 
612 
703 
1109 
631 
690 
578 
1299 
462 
973 
632 
631 
1074 
784 
1272 
500 
664 
858 
996 
547 
1095 
563 
988 
788 
1343 
1156 
493 
672 
1216 
579 
569 
573 
1467 
1248 
680 
797 
791 
1100 
1408 
1179 
1156 
819 
729 
1235 
586 
922 
571 
1169 
589 
1006 
547 
1006 
717 
914 
1297 
878 
571 
829 
678 
1075 
1553 
1516 
819 
805 
742 
1069 
1342 
584 
1674 
1813 
757 
1320 
693 
1015 
571 
871 
1024 
1538 
663 
1076 
773 
554 
1058 
696 
1572 
674 
1099 
1388 
1547 
1110 
1037 
584 
1156 
1226 
1919 
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Appendix B2 
Inference Rule Execution Timing Results – Users 
Users 10 50 100 200 500 1000 
Axioms 
Inferred by 
Rule Engine 
17301 17461 17661 18061 19261 21261 
Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard 
Deviation 
18.91 49.94 46.72 51.84 48.31 55.28 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Level of 
Significance 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Margin of 
Error 
3.71 8.61 9.16 10.16 9.47 10.83 
Confidence 
Interval Max 
800.69 827.68 834.13 855.63 898.55 996.01 
Sample Time 
Mean 
796.98 819.07 824.97 845.47 889.08 985.18 
Confidence 
Interval Min 
793.27 810.46 815.81 835.31 879.61 974.35 
Run Results 831 
799 
800 
794 
795 
789 
791 
790 
792 
812 
792 
801 
804 
772 
800 
781 
796 
803 
806 
795 
797 
813 
819 
821 
805 
821 
805 
820 
819 
836 
813 
821 
807 
803 
835 
820 
811 
826 
822 
827 
796 
813 
815 
831 
804 
821 
835 
865 
819 
830 
803 
842 
837 
842 
869 
835 
817 
861 
819 
834 
850 
841 
836 
843 
838 
836 
829 
850 
871 
866 
875 
900 
882 
883 
884 
886 
897 
878 
891 
875 
893 
874 
881 
859 
896 
935 
984 
960 
988 
950 
991 
960 
1010 
967 
992 
935 
982 
949 
994 
937 
991 
961 
142 
 
 
 
819 
798 
805 
803 
791 
804 
782 
820 
789 
781 
816 
822 
829 
788 
798 
759 
797 
789 
812 
796 
797 
814 
801 
804 
815 
779 
813 
788 
794 
813 
772 
796 
781 
819 
773 
787 
772 
811 
783 
812 
788 
819 
766 
820 
781 
806 
774 
805 
788 
766 
774 
818 
812 
810 
819 
835 
800 
834 
1071 
786 
789 
796 
798 
804 
788 
788 
792 
789 
795 
797 
790 
789 
795 
781 
780 
804 
787 
781 
789 
836 
793 
804 
794 
1068 
813 
829 
828 
812 
819 
804 
821 
829 
812 
805 
821 
799 
820 
781 
813 
805 
828 
805 
804 
825 
829 
828 
819 
819 
837 
1037 
805 
797 
822 
819 
835 
819 
813 
838 
813 
819 
819 
837 
820 
821 
820 
828 
807 
830 
826 
826 
819 
813 
821 
827 
1078 
818 
814 
813 
819 
796 
789 
792 
819 
822 
791 
789 
805 
804 
811 
818 
806 
809 
822 
835 
825 
824 
825 
835 
837 
851 
1063 
822 
845 
819 
844 
807 
835 
820 
815 
819 
819 
852 
836 
852 
843 
827 
841 
836 
819 
836 
819 
856 
836 
834 
839 
1125 
848 
834 
819 
822 
834 
819 
830 
829 
825 
820 
835 
841 
843 
827 
835 
821 
829 
840 
889 
872 
835 
889 
885 
897 
905 
1094 
860 
865 
882 
866 
876 
868 
859 
868 
867 
859 
883 
891 
876 
891 
890 
875 
865 
873 
866 
878 
873 
869 
903 
882 
1123 
883 
866 
891 
856 
867 
883 
891 
884 
866 
874 
871 
879 
875 
861 
866 
884 
882 
869 
943 
990 
967 
980 
959 
968 
960 
1232 
993 
944 
984 
952 
990 
942 
992 
959 
967 
985 
992 
970 
998 
948 
998 
950 
984 
953 
951 
979 
999 
982 
961 
981 
1265 
993 
967 
1000 
969 
987 
976 
981 
958 
1000 
961 
1013 
969 
990 
1007 
993 
959 
961 
1000 
143 
 
 
 
804 
773 
797 
800 
820 
812 
804 
791 
779 
788 
805 
776 
781 
797 
788 
790 
804 
795 
788 
834 
807 
774 
804 
897 
777 
816 
807 
766 
813 
804 
795 
764 
796 
804 
828 
834 
805 
834 
1008 
828 
822 
827 
822 
813 
805 
845 
814 
844 
835 
823 
819 
828 
819 
822 
811 
819 
804 
821 
845 
827 
828 
824 
833 
860 
816 
809 
809 
819 
797 
852 
1024 
814 
803 
813 
805 
811 
828 
819 
812 
812 
805 
804 
800 
815 
798 
797 
812 
806 
822 
813 
803 
842 
812 
800 
808 
1037 
835 
820 
836 
826 
833 
835 
1095 
835 
851 
834 
855 
840 
818 
837 
846 
826 
859 
843 
828 
822 
841 
836 
851 
845 
860 
837 
834 
859 
819 
835 
851 
1084 
866 
874 
882 
869 
892 
896 
1132 
915 
891 
868 
908 
852 
866 
912 
882 
891 
875 
900 
889 
916 
903 
890 
854 
884 
879 
875 
897 
866 
893 
876 
892 
1110 
936 
1006 
986 
974 
992 
977 
1247 
968 
992 
985 
1007 
944 
1015 
954 
1000 
955 
1007 
970 
975 
954 
991 
951 
995 
955 
1000 
921 
996 
953 
1008 
955 
967 
1194 
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Appendix B3 
Axiom Transfer Timing Results – Users 
Users 10 50 100 200 500 1000 
Axioms 
Exported to 
OWL Model 
17301 17461 17661 18061 19261 21261 
Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard 
Deviation 
22.00 62.60 58.90 59.53 60.19 58.01 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Level of 
Significance 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Margin of 
Error 
4.31 12.27 11.54 11.67 11.80 11.37 
Confidence 
Interval Max 
269.92 297.80 301.03 304.10 310.74 316.69 
Sample Time 
Mean 
265.61 285.53 289.49 292.43 298.94 305.32 
Confidence 
Interval Min 
261.30 273.26 277.95 280.76 287.14 293.95 
Run Results 258 
250 
250 
249 
250 
250 
250 
260 
250 
250 
265 
250 
259 
257 
250 
258 
264 
265 
250 
266 
265 
250 
240 
257 
276 
256 
266 
258 
265 
234 
265 
265 
288 
276 
265 
274 
271 
273 
273 
266 
260 
258 
266 
281 
265 
285 
275 
250 
274 
257 
266 
265 
273 
266 
250 
272 
287 
272 
257 
290 
266 
265 
265 
266 
274 
274 
274 
287 
265 
266 
258 
274 
282 
272 
265 
281 
281 
266 
255 
266 
265 
281 
281 
281 
272 
282 
289 
288 
281 
297 
281 
291 
281 
287 
273 
281 
288 
282 
282 
305 
287 
287 
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265 
250 
265 
250 
277 
265 
250 
266 
250 
266 
241 
250 
265 
266 
266 
266 
275 
264 
281 
273 
294 
282 
281 
350 
336 
250 
266 
257 
265 
253 
235 
269 
265 
240 
258 
250 
260 
266 
290 
250 
313 
246 
297 
255 
266 
250 
275 
250 
272 
235 
256 
272 
289 
276 
266 
328 
328 
421 
508 
274 
266 
265 
266 
266 
275 
250 
260 
242 
265 
250 
266 
265 
273 
250 
266 
281 
297 
281 
291 
297 
335 
336 
445 
516 
250 
250 
281 
250 
257 
266 
256 
234 
250 
265 
265 
277 
288 
266 
265 
266 
265 
265 
260 
281 
281 
292 
335 
312 
413 
475 
281 
250 
258 
259 
258 
258 
265 
266 
266 
269 
250 
257 
288 
273 
266 
281 
274 
281 
290 
290 
297 
328 
344 
477 
510 
264 
256 
265 
266 
250 
235 
266 
266 
274 
272 
265 
250 
266 
250 
281 
265 
273 
274 
282 
282 
266 
290 
336 
328 
398 
556 
290 
265 
257 
265 
265 
265 
259 
278 
273 
234 
266 
274 
282 
274 
266 
266 
266 
281 
297 
289 
294 
336 
360 
475 
522 
265 
266 
265 
250 
266 
258 
257 
244 
265 
266 
266 
266 
274 
250 
266 
266 
281 
297 
313 
289 
293 
297 
328 
344 
414 
586 
250 
265 
265 
272 
274 
282 
266 
266 
266 
282 
266 
281 
271 
274 
288 
266 
318 
281 
293 
297 
281 
334 
346 
421 
553 
266 
266 
274 
288 
271 
265 
281 
258 
274 
289 
282 
266 
281 
281 
296 
271 
290 
296 
297 
303 
297 
313 
313 
367 
393 
568 
282 
291 
281 
288 
275 
281 
281 
281 
281 
297 
282 
281 
289 
281 
289 
296 
297 
297 
297 
313 
304 
324 
390 
390 
570 
271 
290 
281 
281 
250 
281 
265 
281 
272 
292 
282 
275 
254 
281 
282 
282 
266 
289 
146 
 
 
 
266 
281 
243 
297 
257 
234 
250 
329 
250 
296 
258 
312 
279 
250 
260 
281 
281 
251 
313 
250 
250 
257 
243 
266 
305 
250 
257 
297 
250 
243 
313 
289 
265 
273 
273 
314 
328 
483 
586 
234 
250 
250 
250 
266 
234 
250 
254 
250 
251 
250 
250 
260 
257 
265 
273 
250 
266 
297 
266 
324 
296 
297 
406 
461 
287 
273 
297 
312 
328 
453 
578 
257 
234 
265 
266 
257 
265 
267 
235 
281 
265 
266 
266 
265 
261 
272 
281 
281 
266 
290 
289 
319 
296 
336 
406 
453 
281 
297 
281 
333 
344 
453 
509 
250 
272 
257 
256 
266 
249 
274 
266 
281 
271 
257 
279 
265 
265 
281 
281 
266 
281 
281 
313 
303 
313 
352 
374 
484 
297 
297 
297 
312 
342 
428 
554 
274 
271 
274 
266 
266 
281 
272 
266 
282 
265 
281 
276 
281 
281 
282 
281 
281 
289 
266 
352 
313 
312 
359 
399 
469 
304 
308 
314 
313 
359 
391 
523 
281 
288 
276 
288 
277 
297 
265 
265 
281 
272 
281 
281 
281 
281 
288 
288 
297 
303 
297 
297 
307 
309 
359 
382 
553 
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Appendix B4 
Axiom Export Timing Results - Projects 
Projects 1 2 3 4 5 
Axioms 
Exported to 
Rule Engine 
30868 30968 31068 31168 31268 
Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard 
Deviation 
199.27 232.01 228.80 216.88 269.92 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Level of 
Significance 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Margin of 
Error 
49.09 45.47 44.84 42.50 52.90 
Confidence 
Interval Max 
1036.64 1050.58 1119.01 1115.10 1224.24 
Sample Time 
Mean 
987.55 1005.11 1074.17 1072.60 1171.34 
Confidence 
Interval Min 
938.46 959.64 1029.33 1030.10 1118.44 
Run Results 787 
1095 
756 
852 
1040 
1025 
999 
769 
958 
710 
760 
1204 
741 
953 
1254 
1047 
837 
1425 
1209 
999 
872 
1273 
1007 
1040 
1313 
1072 
874 
725 
766 
812 
913 
1109 
849 
1350 
1077 
1018 
1233 
968 
788 
1305 
1339 
880 
1008 
866 
1115 
1147 
1181 
835 
1202 
1057 
898 
1359 
756 
823 
823 
805 
1144 
792 
913 
774 
851 
882 
1183 
1178 
970 
998 
926 
1096 
1600 
1024 
1112 
1150 
1541 
969 
1558 
1161 
1571 
1474 
1686 
1070 
872 
1766 
1225 
1282 
929 
148 
 
 
 
1181 
1235 
819 
828 
1137 
1278 
887 
1310 
790 
907 
1350 
962 
818 
961 
984 
705 
1306 
850 
811 
781 
1028 
836 
1002 
956 
766 
897 
663 
800 
945 
764 
1523 
875 
856 
859 
960 
1030 
903 
928 
1023 
1379 
1363 
921 
957 
1125 
904 
855 
906 
1266 
1079 
1144 
1522 
1233 
740 
1043 
1192 
970 
857 
860 
1424 
1125 
1534 
884 
1086 
1221 
947 
1010 
976 
941 
788 
1292 
1309 
937 
795 
1248 
1070 
1292 
899 
773 
745 
871 
1329 
778 
1008 
1230 
960 
977 
969 
1464 
804 
788 
904 
834 
940 
807 
1391 
757 
792 
827 
1080 
812 
697 
937 
1392 
873 
1154 
1545 
744 
991 
1360 
1131 
850 
850 
1084 
906 
1275 
929 
739 
771 
1609 
891 
1504 
912 
1037 
1653 
990 
1409 
1164 
871 
1444 
982 
1028 
818 
826 
963 
1397 
1313 
1125 
1147 
1077 
1405 
873 
1051 
1040 
946 
1045 
1391 
1262 
992 
1596 
874 
868 
885 
1062 
885 
1582 
959 
867 
1013 
758 
919 
1399 
1222 
1266 
930 
810 
1203 
957 
850 
743 
1418 
1217 
1236 
980 
883 
1396 
1367 
1283 
1588 
1251 
1021 
1336 
874 
1042 
1443 
1044 
1590 
787 
802 
774 
994 
994 
1212 
1038 
838 
869 
941 
1499 
915 
1054 
946 
946 
1029 
928 
1266 
922 
1422 
1423 
1665 
1126 
1494 
1465 
1256 
1674 
918 
992 
789 
992 
1119 
993 
953 
1197 
1114 
992 
929 
1110 
1110 
873 
1608 
1359 
913 
1117 
1312 
860 
863 
1445 
1584 
1816 
1043 
999 
967 
1258 
985 
1149 
905 
991 
1547 
1065 
1009 
1695 
1388 
1024 
1076 
952 
1470 
1422 
149 
 
 
 
1265 
853 
949 
1052 
827 
827 
853 
1010 
734 
835 
848 
857 
944 
1288 
938 
982 
859 
999 
1283 
1034 
1255 
1342 
712 
844 
1080 
852 
851 
1023 
1501 
870 
1200 
1266 
960 
739 
729 
891 
732 
1421 
1361 
1218 
788 
1372 
1468 
805 
1003 
1230 
1405 
1183 
1047 
741 
722 
717 
998 
1108 
991 
719 
782 
728 
991 
1242 
750 
830 
1031 
1054 
1031 
1153 
899 
1424 
767 
920 
1107 
906 
906 
898 
893 
762 
842 
1368 
1407 
1226 
937 
899 
1187 
1016 
984 
1022 
1158 
1037 
882 
1076 
1132 
1414 
765 
715 
1030 
1693 
1022 
938 
1203 
899 
1126 
1084 
1394 
1126 
1256 
1554 
1370 
805 
875 
1079 
1015 
1252 
1015 
1355 
1031 
1319 
873 
961 
892 
949 
1150 
1247 
1297 
1230 
1017 
1034 
1329 
1126 
819 
904 
805 
772 
999 
1095 
807 
1112 
1056 
1209 
860 
1549 
909 
928 
969 
1191 
909 
1146 
1364 
1070 
893 
1500 
1442 
872 
851 
986 
1611 
1571 
1344 
1010 
981 
1260 
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Appendix B5 
Inference Rule Execution Timing Results - Projects 
Projects 1 2 3 4 5 
Axioms 
Inferred by 
Rule Engine 
28735 31235 33735 36235 38735 
Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard 
Deviation 
340.00 631.55 310.14 344.92 213.90 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Level of 
Significance 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Margin of 
Error 
66.64 123.78 60.79 67.60 41.92 
Confidence 
Interval Max 
1875.79 2070.66 2153.83 2253.61 2233.58 
Sample Time 
Mean 
1809.15 1946.88 2093.04 2186.01 2191.66 
Confidence 
Interval Min 
1742.51 1823.10 2032.25 2118.41 2149.74 
Run Results 1701 
1701 
1724 
1694 
1694 
1726 
1688 
1741 
1723 
1703 
1702 
1708 
1665 
1684 
2303 
2270 
3529 
2842 
2384 
2299 
1806 
2291 
1819 
2302 
1739 
1761 
1778 
1803 
1760 
1751 
1774 
1729 
1767 
1788 
2466 
2453 
1939 
2363 
2417 
2398 
2416 
2373 
2456 
1772 
1851 
1882 
1783 
1891 
1823 
1834 
1851 
2595 
2962 
2613 
2613 
2886 
2592 
2402 
2574 
2413 
2064 
1877 
1987 
1910 
1936 
1898 
1946 
1930 
2250 
2196 
2091 
2103 
2097 
2079 
2126 
2111 
2066 
2071 
2152 
2014 
2181 
2861 
2083 
2695 
2120 
151 
 
 
 
2252 
2198 
2249 
2175 
1703 
1588 
1685 
1568 
1687 
1671 
1670 
1654 
1690 
1902 
1672 
1656 
1678 
1691 
1710 
1679 
1655 
1698 
1642 
1690 
1645 
1655 
2380 
2230 
2175 
2230 
3367 
2229 
2136 
2239 
2124 
1676 
2135 
1785 
2124 
1662 
1659 
1649 
1577 
1583 
1592 
1570 
1570 
1575 
1587 
1583 
1586 
1767 
1761 
1808 
1747 
1755 
1773 
1811 
2294 
2754 
2346 
2315 
1770 
2268 
1777 
2269 
1797 
1802 
1756 
1781 
1788 
1807 
1827 
1788 
1771 
1778 
1765 
1763 
1765 
1752 
1769 
1781 
1818 
2424 
2873 
1805 
2326 
1810 
2292 
2345 
1769 
2328 
1788 
1732 
1779 
1789 
1795 
1754 
1831 
1778 
1801 
1809 
1825 
1803 
1850 
1836 
1815 
1936 
1901 
2434 
2519 
2924 
2414 
2391 
2426 
2378 
2445 
2364 
2457 
1822 
1874 
1820 
1772 
1882 
1827 
1818 
1866 
1788 
2184 
1787 
1865 
1815 
1910 
1866 
2515 
3010 
2457 
2387 
2440 
2399 
2400 
2455 
2360 
1897 
1834 
1836 
1813 
1832 
1868 
1770 
1846 
1821 
1864 
1950 
1906 
1974 
1914 
1954 
1881 
1978 
2779 
2570 
2731 
2148 
2972 
2623 
2451 
2619 
2411 
1943 
1932 
1906 
1935 
1885 
1979 
1917 
1944 
1934 
1945 
1928 
1984 
1927 
1943 
1894 
1999 
2735 
3029 
2577 
3045 
2550 
2550 
2381 
2578 
2450 
1958 
1928 
1904 
1924 
1919 
1933 
1914 
1929 
1925 
1953 
2152 
2093 
2091 
2123 
2068 
2137 
2070 
2148 
2916 
2102 
2135 
2125 
2067 
2099 
2140 
2051 
2087 
2133 
2080 
2146 
2813 
2092 
2199 
2131 
2068 
2145 
2135 
2191 
2160 
2178 
2091 
2227 
2928 
2077 
2109 
2172 
2144 
2158 
2076 
2203 
2083 
2161 
2095 
2141 
2817 
2111 
2105 
2669 
2128 
2065 
2071 
152 
 
 
 
1573 
1574 
1590 
1568 
1611 
1655 
2420 
2237 
2125 
1737 
2109 
1658 
2109 
1648 
1587 
1662 
1614 
1604 
1594 
1609 
1596 
1582 
1593 
1584 
1586 
1601 
1592 
1590 
1576 
1596 
1600 
2393 
1773 
1780 
1812 
1764 
1818 
1816 
2459 
2363 
2805 
1795 
2821 
2382 
2294 
1798 
2354 
1804 
1764 
1757 
1806 
1779 
1748 
1803 
1789 
1813 
1800 
1789 
1775 
1785 
1787 
1811 
1805 
2495 
1821 
1852 
1838 
1830 
1875 
1918 
2411 
2537 
2537 
2476 
2537 
2444 
2480 
2403 
2510 
2339 
2469 
1858 
1905 
1873 
1813 
1899 
1847 
1859 
1902 
1844 
1852 
1914 
1816 
1937 
1916 
2406 
1931 
1925 
1921 
1946 
1896 
1993 
2760 
2614 
2443 
2602 
2711 
2457 
2588 
2368 
2566 
1858 
1998 
1906 
1931 
1917 
1928 
1902 
2100 
1940 
1961 
1926 
1904 
1921 
1973 
1935 
2026 
2518 
2183 
2073 
2120 
2060 
2190 
2827 
2199 
2104 
2210 
2108 
2145 
2115 
2167 
2126 
2195 
2084 
2373 
2813 
2083 
2138 
2034 
2156 
2062 
2113 
2111 
2118 
2089 
2061 
2141 
2075 
2121 
2770 
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Appendix B6 
Axiom Transfer Timing Results - Projects 
Projects 1 2 3 4 5 
Axioms 
Exported to 
OWL Model 
28735 31235 33735 36235 38735 
Sample Size 100 100 100 100 100 
Standard 
Deviation 
940.49 748.19 507.64 378.22 153.92 
Confidence 
Coefficient 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Level of 
Significance 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Margin of 
Error 
184.33 146.64 99.50 74.13 30.17 
Confidence 
Interval Max 
2290.60 2294.01 2401.41 2480.95 2445.84 
Sample Time 
Mean 
2106.27 2147.37 2301.91 2406.82 2415.67 
Confidence 
Interval Min 
1921.94 2000.73 2202.41 2332.69 2385.50 
Run Results 1426 
1456 
1438 
1429 
1469 
1448 
1466 
1531 
1424 
1431 
1497 
1477 
1509 
1487 
1567 
5825 
5378 
2716 
2348 
2635 
2545 
2562 
2168 
2328 
2126 
2152 
2178 
1741 
1770 
1833 
1730 
1667 
1715 
1729 
3123 
3246 
3010 
2233 
2233 
2702 
2699 
2782 
1831 
2250 
1791 
1882 
1825 
1791 
1851 
2162 
1822 
2678 
2738 
2364 
3364 
2196 
2712 
2872 
2897 
2756 
2162 
2446 
2500 
2062 
2103 
2439 
2096 
2009 
2886 
2416 
2366 
2338 
2689 
2311 
2436 
2367 
2311 
2333 
2419 
2346 
2612 
2767 
2303 
2314 
2309 
154 
 
 
 
4480 
3718 
3624 
3329 
2611 
3541 
2547 
3402 
1891 
1896 
2033 
1812 
1613 
1440 
1608 
1335 
1495 
1419 
1491 
1412 
1730 
1451 
1545 
1511 
1560 
1536 
1590 
1556 
1751 
1789 
2864 
2704 
3251 
3575 
3489 
2589 
3239 
2592 
3307 
2161 
1897 
1971 
3486 
1832 
1833 
1420 
1461 
1444 
1994 
1412 
1533 
1726 
1633 
1630 
1670 
1672 
1656 
1943 
1883 
2582 
4274 
4562 
4490 
4341 
4162 
4563 
3595 
2217 
2125 
2062 
1843 
1756 
1832 
1696 
1677 
1701 
1717 
1665 
1658 
1639 
1729 
1676 
1858 
1904 
2806 
2173 
2545 
2185 
2551 
2315 
2206 
2087 
2210 
2141 
1999 
1704 
1641 
1760 
1709 
1831 
1700 
1772 
1855 
1880 
1835 
1875 
1952 
1998 
2297 
2261 
3049 
2273 
2567 
2084 
2158 
3702 
2230 
2843 
2537 
2225 
2205 
2180 
1789 
1788 
1792 
2178 
1913 
1859 
1913 
1822 
1893 
1831 
1900 
2284 
2170 
2793 
3088 
3554 
2021 
2928 
2806 
2316 
2644 
2444 
2273 
2216 
2174 
1884 
1830 
2281 
1861 
1868 
1856 
2169 
2091 
2111 
2112 
2187 
2056 
2253 
2507 
2965 
2155 
3345 
3145 
2403 
2950 
2717 
2015 
2736 
2773 
2531 
2121 
2092 
2164 
2464 
2108 
2055 
2087 
2023 
2077 
2081 
2076 
2048 
2266 
2438 
2158 
2738 
2417 
2363 
2363 
3058 
2520 
2952 
2834 
3734 
2535 
2116 
2077 
2125 
2454 
2157 
2062 
2167 
2272 
2404 
2352 
2336 
2296 
2320 
2326 
2781 
2787 
2376 
2745 
2423 
2430 
2428 
2341 
2389 
2358 
2295 
2380 
2442 
2789 
2322 
2640 
2326 
2288 
2427 
2261 
2324 
2338 
2340 
2324 
2645 
2766 
2312 
2327 
2668 
2288 
2327 
2313 
2451 
2290 
2317 
2314 
2425 
2676 
2368 
2342 
2162 
2302 
2373 
2291 
155 
 
 
 
1378 
1403 
1491 
1446 
1587 
1656 
1619 
3411 
3543 
2641 
3535 
3270 
3300 
2865 
3347 
1871 
3531 
1721 
1750 
1343 
1380 
1382 
1918 
1329 
1398 
1335 
1321 
1411 
1373 
1459 
1448 
2137 
1768 
1758 
1736 
1803 
1703 
1784 
1835 
2643 
2917 
2712 
2703 
2324 
2463 
2303 
2575 
2183 
2012 
2146 
2023 
1764 
1653 
1758 
1726 
1715 
1756 
1832 
1749 
1773 
1829 
1743 
1800 
1833 
1823 
1806 
1789 
1938 
1849 
2208 
2113 
3965 
3965 
3379 
2971 
2291 
2089 
2034 
3309 
2998 
3085 
2536 
2463 
2490 
2046 
2024 
2063 
2409 
2111 
2064 
2095 
2098 
2083 
2121 
2495 
2273 
2014 
2041 
2036 
2112 
2058 
2121 
2508 
3398 
2077 
3107 
2912 
2628 
2773 
2879 
2495 
2778 
2426 
2913 
2443 
2082 
2024 
2139 
2410 
2099 
2162 
2173 
2164 
2119 
2103 
2079 
2435 
2429 
2329 
2282 
2478 
2309 
2522 
2722 
2428 
2278 
2767 
2301 
2326 
2328 
2306 
2362 
2470 
2355 
2570 
2699 
2335 
2403 
2312 
2574 
2410 
2340 
2401 
2343 
2295 
2282 
2310 
2340 
2434 
2616 
156 
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